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Abstract 
Of the Canadian agencies involved in intelligence work, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has tended to be overlooked. In fact, DFAIT acts as a 
collector, analyzer and disseminator of foreign intelligence. It is actively involved in foreign 
intelligence collection, participates in international intelligence sharing, and contributes to 
the Canadian intelligence-community. This thesis explores and highlights for the first time 
DFAIT's involvement in foreign intelligence work, albeit selectively, over the past sixty years. 
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Intelligence means knowledge. 
-Sherman Kent1 
The foreign ministry is in the business of collecting information. 
-Basil Robinson2 
Everything we do is overt intelligence. 
-Allan Gotlieb3 
Chapter One: Introduction 
According to one authority, the discussion of intelligence issues in Canada has been 
a "political taboo."4 Certainly there has been relatively little academic and public discourse 
in Canada about intelligence structures, methods and policies.5 
It is the case that in all countries much secrecy surrounds intelligence matters. The 
Canadian public seems particularly poorly informed and unaware of government operations 
and procedures in regards to intelligence, and this unawareness also extends to members of 
1
 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Hamden: Archon Books, 1965), 3. Kent's 
definition of intelligence is one of the most commonly used by intelligence practitioners and academics in 
scholarly work. 
2
 Basil Robinson, Interview with author, December 6, 2003, Ottawa, Ontario. 
3
 Allan Gotlieb, telephone interview with author, September 23, 2003. 
4
 Peter G. Russell, telephone interview with author, August 8, 2003. Alistair Hensler, a former Assistant 
Director of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), explains that "the norm has been for a small 
cadre of public servants to address intelligence-related matters behind closed doors instead of seeking 
broader opinions from the public or even from their own colleagues in government. (Alistair S. Hensler, 
"Canadian Intelligence: An Insider's Perspective," Canadian Foreign Policy 6, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 127) 
5
 Martin Rudner notes that "in the words of British scholar Christopher Andrew, [intelligence] is the "missing 
dimension" of international studies" (Martin Rudner, "Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: 
Capacity-Building to Meet Societal Demand," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, 
no. 3 (2009): 110). Andrew's comment highlights the lack of discussion of intelligence in the foreign policy 
literature and international relations text books. The late Geoffrey R. Weller also mentions that only a "few 
courses on the topic are currently offered in [Canadian] universities, and even fewer programs of study 
contain an intelligence component" (Geoffrey R. Weller, "Assessing Canadian Intelligence Literature: 1980-
2000," InternationalJournal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 1 (2001): 56). In 2008, only eight 
Canadian universities were teaching intelligence courses on a part-time or full-time basis. In regards to 
Canadian scholarly research, Rudner noted that "out of more than 1,800 Canada Research Chairs established 
in Canadian universities since 2000 under that federal initiative to promote academic excellence in priority 
2 
Parliament (MPs) and government officials. Until recently, the Canadian government only 
had a handful of publications on the subject matter available in the public domain.6 The 
government has traditionally followed a cautious policy, ensuring that intelligence 
structures and operations are hidden from prying eyes. 
Another factor may be that Canadians believe Canada has a record and an 
international image as a peacekeeper, a promoter of world peace and helpful fixer in 
international relations.7 The governments of Canada and many Canadians may worry that 
an association with foreign intelligence operations might contradict this benevolent image 
in the world. 
One Canadian government department in particular does not openly discuss its 
intelligence role - the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).8 Nor is 
fields identified by the universities themselves, not one was dedicated to Intelligence Studies. Not a single 
one" (Rudner, "Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity-Building to Meet Societal Demand," 113). 
6
 The most commonly referenced government documents on Canadian intelligence are those of the Privy 
Council Office (PCO) and several commission reports. See Canada, Privy Council Office, The Canadian Security 
Intelligence Community: Helping Keep Canada and Canadians Safe and Secure, (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 
2001); Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, A New 
Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities, 2006, <http://epe.lac-
bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher arar/07-09-
13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/EnglishReportDecl22006.pdf>: Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning 
Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Second Report: Freedom and Security Under the Law, 
Vol 2, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1981). 
7
 Don Munton and Tom Keating, "Internationalism and the Canadian Public," Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 34, no. 3 (September 2001), 520. Other Canadian academics also discuss the theme of Canada as a 
helpful fixer, international broker, peacekeeper and promoter of internationalism, see Mark Neufeld, 
"Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as a Middle Power," Studies in Political Economy 
48 (1995), 7-29; Andrew Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions (Scarborough: 
Prentice-Hall, 1997); Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1997); 
Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We lost Our Place in the World (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd, 
2003); and Tom Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy 
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd, 1993); 
The Department has changed its name several times, from External Affairs, to External Affairs and 
International Trade, to the current name. This thesis uses the appropriate name for each particular period in 
history, or else it refers to DFAIT and its predecessors as the "the Department." 
3 
that role mentioned often by academics and the media.9 Nevertheless, the Department is 
much involved in foreign intelligence work, is an active participant in the Canadian 
intelligence community, and a participant in international intelligence sharing. In fact, the 
Department acts as a collector, analyzer and disseminator of foreign intelligence. This 
thesis will explore and highlight the Department's involvement in foreign intelligence work, 
selectively, over the past sixty years. 
1.0 Concept of Intelligence 
The concept of intelligence has been defined simply as being information, 
knowledge or hindsight of past, present and future events.10 The concept of intelligence 
used in this thesis is somewhat narrower. As defined by Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt in 
Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, intelligence is "information 
relevant to a government's formulation and implementation of policy to further its national 
security interests and to deal with threats from actual or potential adversaries."11 
9
 For example, the Department of Foreign Affairs rarely if ever described its intelligence activities in its annual 
reports, although most of the activities of its other units are at least mentioned. When required, the 
Department did acknowledge the existence of certain intelligence-related units, such as the former "Defence 
Liaison (2)" division. Of all the texts on Canadian foreign policy, only a few feature the Department's foreign 
intelligence functions, and most do not even mention them. One of the few texts that does is now forty years 
old: James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1961). Prominent texts or other books on Canadian foreign policy that do not discuss 
intelligence or foreign intelligence issues, include: Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy 
(Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1997); Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, 
Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993); 
David B. Dewittand David Leyton-Brown, Canada's International Security Policy (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall 
Canada, 1995); Arthur E. Blanchette, ed. Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-2000: Major Documents and Speeches, 
(Ottawa: Golden Dog Press, 2000); Don Munton and John Kirton, eds. Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases, 
(Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1992); and Duane Bratt & Christopher J. Kukucha ed. Readings in 
Canadian Foreign Policy: Classis Debates & New Ideas (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
10
 Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 3. 
11
 Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, (Dulles: 
Brassey's, 2002), 1. 
4 
A similar definition is provided by Blair Seaborn, now a retired Canadian diplomat 
and former Intelligence and Security Coordinator at the Privy Council Office (PCO). Seaborn 
suggests that: 
foreign intelligence is information and analysis relating to the capabilities, 
intentions, or activities of a foreign state, person, or organization. It includes 
data of a political, economic, military, security, technological or social nature, 
obtained from overt as well as covert sources. Its purposes are to protect 
Canada's interests, to facilitate the foreign and defence policy process, and to 
provide advantage in the pursuit of overall foreign and defence policy 
objectives.12 
Whatever precise definition is used, observers and practitioners alike agree the basic 
purpose of intelligence is to provide adequate information to government officials so they 
may make timely and decisive policy decisions.13 Shulsky and Schmitt indicate that the 
"adversary" is not necessarily an enemy perse; it could be a friendly government with 
which one is negotiating an economic agreement or other treaty.14 In most cases a 
government is seeking an advantage over others so it can "maximize the benefits."15 
There are numerous ways of categorizing intelligence. One distinguishes foreign 
intelligence and other types such as security and criminal intelligence. Another typology 
distinguishes political, military and economic intelligence. This thesis will return to 
discussing these various types of intelligence in later chapters. 
1.1 Intelligence Cycle 
James Blair Seaborn, "Commentary No. 45: Intelligence and Policy: What is Constant? What is Changing?," a 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service publication, (June 1994), <http://www.csis-
scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm45-eng.asp>. 
13
 For other definitions of foreign intelligence, see, Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 47-51; and Kurt F. Jensen, Cautious Beginnings: Canadian 
Foreign Intelligence 1939-1951 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 2. 
14
 Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, 1. 
Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, 1. 
5 
This thesis will make use of the characterization of intelligence processes known as 
the intelligence cycle, a concept that presents as cyclical the processes of the tasking, 
collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence. In the process of tasking, the 
government identifies something that is of concern to it and requests its intelligence 
agencies to collect further information. Collection is the physical process of gathering raw 
information through various methods. Analysis/assessment is the process of "identifying 
significant facts, comparing them with existing facts and drawing conclusions."16 
Dissemination is the process of providing government officials with "intelligence product" 
for their use in making policy decisions. Dissemination can also involve international sharing 
of intelligence and product. These four aspects form the stages of intelligence work. 
Foreign intelligence, my main focus here, comes in various forms, reflecting 
collection through several different methods. One type is human intelligence (HUMINT), 
the collection of information from human sources. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is collection 
of information through interception of electromagnetic waves, which include radio, radar, 
and other electronic emissions. Another type method of intelligence is open source 
intelligence (OSINT), the collection of information in the public domain through the use of 
non-clandestine methods, such as reading newspapers, watching television, researching 
through the Internet, or interviewing people. Most if not all intelligence agencies today 
gather OSINT to some extent, in addition to other types. Indeed, one estimate is that eighty 
percent of the contents of intelligence assessments represent open source material.17 
1
 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 100. 
Kurt F. Jensen, e-mail message to author, December 26, 2008. 
6 
The government of Canada has dedicated agencies to collect SIGINT (the 
Communication Security Establishment) and security intelligence (the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service). These agencies contribute to Canada's ability to understand the 
threats it faces and operate effectively in the international system. Their role will be 
discussed more fully in Chapter 2. Canada also has an agency specializing in HUMINT, and 
that is the Department of Foreign Affairs and its predecessors. 
1.2 Canada's Foreign Intelligence Debate 
Almost all countries conduct foreign intelligence operations. Canada, however, is 
one of the few Western industrialized countries that does not have an explicit or dedicated 
foreign intelligence agency, one similar in purpose to the United States Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) or the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also known as MI6). Both Japan 
and New Zealand are in a similar situation. In New Zealand, the government operates the 
External Assessments Bureau (EAB), an assessment unit, that does not collect intelligence or 
deal with security matters. EAB informs the government generally on international 
relations.18 New Zealand does have other agencies and departments that collect foreign 
intelligence in a limited form, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) has 
foreign intelligence collection capabilities. 
In Japan, the Cabinet Research Office (NAICHO) is an assessment unit that uses 
OSINT and other information in the reports it produces. Japan too has other intelligence 
structures that have foreign intelligence capabilities, such as the three internationally-
Nicky Hager, Secret Power: New Zealand's Role in the International Spy Network (Nelson: Craig Potton 
Publishing, 1996), 268. 
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oriented ministries, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
and Foreign Affairs (Giamusho).19 
Both Japan and New Zealand have supplemented their lack of a dedicated foreign 
intelligence agency by using their respective foreign ministries, and other government 
departments and agencies that have access to the international system and relevant 
capabilities, to collect foreign intelligence. Both countries, like Canada, also have foreign 
intelligence sharing-agreements with their allies, of which the United States tends to be the 
main supplier of foreign intelligence to these countries. More will be said later on this point. 
For decades there has been a limited debate about Canada's foreign intelligence 
capability.20 This debate entered the public domain in the late 1970s as a result of the 
Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(also known as the McDonald Commission), which looked into Canada's foreign and 
domestic intelligence capabilities, and which led to the formation of CSIS. The Commission 
report discussed Canada's intelligence strengths and weaknesses but did not explicitly offer 
any recommendations on the matter of the country's foreign intelligence operations in 
general. Over the past several decades, a number of academics, politicians and past and 
present intelligence officials have contributed arguments on the matter of whether or not 
Canada needs a foreign intelligence agency similar to the CIA. No consensus has emerged 
from this debate about whether such an agency should be created or whether it should be 
19
 John Vito Deluca, "Shedding Light on the Rising Sun," International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence 2, no. 1 (Spring 1988), 10-11. 
Geoffrey Weller notes "some attention has been paid over the past few years to the matter of whether or 
not Canada should have a foreign intelligence service. Canada is one of very few Western powers not to have 
such a service, and the issue has produced a modest debate in the academic literature." (Geoffrey Weller, 
8 
independent or such a capability should be placed inside some other department or 
agency.21 
A key element of the foreign intelligence debate is whether or not Canada should 
have an agency primarily to conduct clandestine HUMINT, by sending operatives abroad, 
and/or establishing agents in foreign countries to pass intelligence to Canadian officials. 
Some advocates acknowledge that establishing such an agency overnight is not possible, 
and that it would take a significant investment to develop one. Whether or not creating 
such an agency is politically possible is another question. 
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 raised again the foreign intelligence 
debate. Following 9/11, Deputy Prime Minister John Manley said that the Chretien 
government would not consider the creation of a foreign intelligence agency.22 Instead, the 
government responded by increasing funding to existing agencies and departments 
involved in limited foreign intelligence collection. Liberal David Pratt initiated a private 
"Assessing Canadian Intelligence Literature: 1980-2000," Internationa/Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence 14, no.l (2001): 54.) 
21
 On the Canadian foreign intelligence debate, see, Stuart Farson, "Accountable and Prepared? Reorganised 
Canada's Intelligence Community for the 21st Century," Canadian Foreign Policy 1, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 43-66; 
Stuart Farson, "Is Canadian intelligence being re-invented?" Canadian Foreign Policy 6, no. 2 (Winter 1999): 
49-83; Thomas D'Arcy Finn, "Does Canada Need a Foreign Intelligence Service," Canadian Foreign Policy 1, no. 
3 (Fall 1993): 149-162; Alistair S. Hensler, "Creating a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service," Canadian Foreign 
Policy 3, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 15-35; Alistair S. Hensler, "Canadian Intelligence: An Insider's Perspective," 
Canadian Foreign Policy 6, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 127-132; Peter G. Russell, "Should Canada Establish a Foreign 
Intelligence Agency?" A Paper written for the Security Intelligence Review Committee, December, 1988; John 
Starnes, "Canadian Internal Security: The Need for a New Approach, New Organization" Canadian Defence 
Quarterly, (1979): 21-26; Richard Kott, "Reinventing the Looking Glass: Developing a Canadian Foreign 
Intelligence Service" (master's thesis, University of Calgary, 2002), <http://www.imss.org/2003/spring-
summer/documents/kott-mss dissertation.pdf>; Jerome Mellon, "The Missing Agency: The Case for a 
Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service" (master's thesis, University of Salford, 2002), 
<http://circ.imellon.com/docs/view.asD?id=370>; Barry Cooper, "CFIS: A Foreign Intelligence Service for 
Canada" Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute Publication (2007), 
<h ttp://www. cdfai. org/PDF/CFIS. pdf>. 
22
 Cnews, "Canada will not create its own foreign spy agency, says John Manley," April 10, 2002, 
member's bill (Bill C-409) in March 2003 proposing the creation of a foreign intelligence 
agency.23 The Bill failed after its first reading, but it brought the issue out in public. 
The matter of a foreign intelligence agency was raised again during the 2006 
election. The Conservative Party announced their intent, in the Conservative Party of 
Canada Federal Election Platform, to "create a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency to 
effectively gather intelligence overseas, independently counter threats before they reach 
Canada, and increase allied intelligence operations."24 The Conservatives won a minority 
government but a decision to create a foreign intelligence agency was not at the top of their 
agenda. In 2007, Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day informed a House of Commons 
committee "that his government has had second thoughts."25 Day said there were two 
problems; first, the financial cost would be enormous; and second, development of such an 
agency would take an extensive amount of time.26 He suggested the government would 
present legislation in 2008 to change the mandate of the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) in order to enhance its limited foreign intelligence capabilities. The minister 
later appeared to be giving second thoughts to this promise as well.27 
23
 Bill C-409, An Act to establish the Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency Canada, 2d Sess., 37th Parliament, 
2002-2003,1st reading, March 17, 2003, 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/private/C-409/C-409 l/C-409 cover-E.html>. 
24
 Conservative Party of Canada, Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 
2006,13 Jan. 2006, <http://conservative.ca/media/20060113-Platform.pdf>. 
25
 Gloria Galloway, "No New agency for foreign intelligence, top spy says," The Globe and Mail, May 29, 2007, 
A5. 
Galloway, "No New agency for foreign intelligence, top spy says." 
27
 Honourable Stockwell Day, "Key Note Speech" at the 2007 annual conference of the Canadian Association 
for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS), September 2007. 
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The point here is that the foreign intelligence debate has rarely acknowledged the 
extent of DFAIT's foreign intelligence work, or its extensive involvement in HUMINT.28 This 
thesis will not debate the merits of having or not having a foreign intelligence agency but 
will outline the Department's role in collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence and 
describe its collection of HUMINT. 
1.3 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is the ministry 
responsible for Canada's external relations and management of Canada's representation 
abroad. It represents the government in all international meetings, conducts consular 
affairs and extends Canadian diplomacy throughout the world. DFAIT operates embassies 
and consulates through which Canada's interests are pursued internationally. In addition to 
these well-recognized tasks, it is actively involved in foreign intelligence. As noted earlier, 
the Department has a long history of participating in foreign intelligence work. 
The Department, however, rarely discusses its foreign intelligence work in the public 
domain. For example, its annual departmental reports do not always acknowledge its 
foreign intelligence work or units.29 Such information was discovered from the 
Department's Acronyms and Symbols website.30 
The Harper government did not, at least publicly, raise the idea that foreign intelligence functions might be 
placed in DFAIT. Many articles provide a superficial description of DFAIT's foreign intelligence work, see 
Jerome Mellon, "The Missing Agency: The Case for a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service" (master's thesis, 
University of Salford, 2002),<http://circ.imellon.com/docs/view.asp?id=370>; Alistair S. Hensler, "Creating a 
Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service," Canadian Foreign Policy 3, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 15-35; Alister S. 
Henseler, "Canadian Intelligence: An Insider's Perspective," Canadian Foreign Policy 6, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 
127-132; Stuart Farson, "Is Canadian intelligence being re-invented?" Canadian Foreign Policy 6, no. 2 (Winter 
1999): 49-83. 
29
 This researcher has compiled a list of intelligence structures of the Department for the past sixty years by 
analyzing its annual reports. In some years these reports list the intelligence units and in others they do not. 
See, for example, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Annual Report 1990-1991: Overview, 
11 
1.4 Diplomatic Reporting VS Intelligence Collection 
Within international relations "diplomacy aims to further a nation's primary 
interests while preserving international order. It is the tool that states use to get their way 
without arousing the opposition or animosity of other states."31 Theoretically one job of 
diplomats is to ascertain the concerns and plans of the host state, or others, may be in 
political, military, or economic affairs. 
A regular duty of Canadian diplomats abroad is to report information of political, 
economic or strategic value to Canadian government, via the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
This function is called diplomatic reporting. The purpose of diplomatic reporting is to 
inform the home government about "the personalities, perspectives, reasoning, 
motivations, objectives and actions of foreign decision makers."32 The information comes 
from various sources, including government publications, academic publications, and media 
reports (i.e. OSINT) as well as from confidential sources - information that represents 
HUMINT. This information is then incorporated with that from "trade, political, economic, 
or various functional bureaux" to inform policy makers.33 
Over the last decade the development of the Internet has likely increased the use of 
open sources, relative to diplomatic reporting. Still, one should not ignore the ability of 
diplomats to access information through their contacts; these can and will never be 
Ottawa, ON, 1991, and Department of External Affairs, Report of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 
ON, 1950. 
30
 Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), DFAIT Acronyms and Symbols, April 
2008, <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/auditreports/syms-en.asp#Symbol>. 
31
 Gordon C. Schloming, Power and Principle in International Affairs (Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1991), 600. 
32
 Charles W. Freeman, Jr., Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy, (Washington: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1997), 24. 
12 
replaced entirely by the Internet. As long as there are closed societies in the world, and 
maybe as long as states continue to try to keep secrets, diplomats will be needed. 
Arthur Andrew states that governments spend a significant amount of money on 
diplomatic reporting, funds which tend to be separate from their overall intelligence 
budgets.34 Diplomatic allowances are provided so that information can be acquired from 
various settings in which diplomats may find themselves. "Cocktail parties, the bane of 
diplomatic life, [are] simply marketplaces where information [is] acquired and paid for in 
whisky and in kind," notes Andrew.35 Of course, not all formal and informal gatherings will 
guarantee new information for diplomats. The hope however is that "mildly alcoholic 
environments" will loosen the tongues of government officials to eagerly listening 
diplomats.36 Diplomatic reporting thus combines both OSINT and HUMINT collection. 
Most information is provided freely by individuals without any expectation of a 
reward. As one former Canadian ambassador states in regards to diplomatic reporting, "It is 
intelligence-gathering in a fundamental sense, requiring analytical and communication skills 
as well as an ability to network with counterparts from a wide variety of cultures."37 Most 
countries place intelligence officers in diplomatic positions to conduct clandestine 
collection, and establishing secret intelligence networks abroad. The purpose of such 
individuals is very clear though not often explicit. 
David C. Reece, A Rich Broth: Memoirs of a Canadian Diplomat, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), 
200. 
34
 Arthur Andrew, The Rise and Fall of Middle Power: Canadian Diplomacy from King to Mulroney (Toronto: 
James Lorimer & Company Ltd., 1993), 132. 
35
 Andrew, The Rise and Fall of Middle Power, 132. 
36
 Andrew, The Rise and Fall of Middle Power, 132. 
37
 Derek H. Burney, Getting It Done: A Memoir (McGill-Queen's University Press 2005), 29. 
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The legality of conducting diplomatic reporting is based on the 1961 Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Article 3.1(d) states that "the functions of diplomatic 
mission consist, inter alia, in ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments 
in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State."38 
The boundary between diplomatic reporting and clandestine collection is in fact very 
unclear. It is very difficult sometimes to distinguish any difference. Related to HUMINT is 
what is sometimes called "gray intelligence" (also spelled "grey"). One definition states that 
"Gray intelligence which is neither entirely Open Source nor Clandestine in origin. Such 
intelligence is obtained by asking for it (very nicely, in fact)."39 Another definition says that 
gray intelligence is "information which is not published or widely diffused, but to which 
access can nevertheless be granted, provided one knows that its exists and has adequate 
channels of communication...Personal letter, private conversation and the like are also 
forms of grey [intelligence]; although they are not confidential, their combination with open 
information can be very revealing."40 Gray intelligence thus pushes the boundaries of 
diplomatic reporting into subtle and relatively non-intrusive forms of clandestine collection. 
Historically, diplomatic reports were the most important form of foreign intelligence for the 
Department. 
1.5 International Intelligence Cooperation 
As noted, Canada does not have an explicitly-dedicated foreign HUMINT agency. To 
some extent, Canada compensates by receiving foreign intelligence from its allies. Michael 
38
 United Nations, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18,1961. 
39
 Kurt Jensen, "Toward a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service," Bout de Papier 22, no. 2 (2006): 22. 
40
 Jon Sigurdson and Patricia Nelson, "Intelligence Gathering and Japan: the Elusive Role of Grey Intelligence." 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 1 (1991): 21. 
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Herman, writes that "[countries] share intelligence when faced by common threats."41 
Among the common threats to Canada and the allies have been the Nazis, the Communist 
bloc and international terrorism. To counter these threats, the western allies created long-
term intelligence, security and defence cooperation and sharing agreements and 
institutions (such as, the BRUSA Agreement, the UKUSA Agreement, and the North 
American Treaty Organization (NATO)).42 
The allied countries undertake a shared responsibility to contribute to and support 
intelligence cooperation. As Herman notes "there is always more information potentially 
available than any agency can collect by itself."43 To gather intelligence on the USSR, 
Canada took advantage of its location to place SIGINT bases in northern and western 
Canada to collect Soviet signals. As will be shown later, Canada also gathered intelligence in 
Indochina and Cuba in the 1950s and 1960s and shared it with the USA and other allies 
when they had less access to these areas. 
Canada was fulfilling a perceived responsibility to cooperate with its allies. Canada 
could not simply receive intelligence and not assist its allies when it could. Herman indicates 
that "doing an ally a favour may produce a return which continues under its own 
momentum for decades."44 
Canadian foreign intelligence operations, some of them conducted by DFAIT and its 
predecessors, represented Canada's commitment to allied foreign intelligence-sharing on 
the basis of the principle of quid pro quo. The Department also contributed to the broader 
41
 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 201. 
42
 The BRUSA and UKUSA Agreements will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4, respectively. 
43
 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 204. 
44
 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 209. 
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alliance intelligence effort through the work of what was known as the Special Intelligence 
Section and the Interview Program Section. Both mimicked already established structures 
in the allied countries. Thus, the Department's intelligence structures and activities, the 
focus of the present thesis, need to be placed in the context of this broader western 
intelligence cooperation effort. 
1.6 Objectives and Questions 
This thesis will focus on two general questions pertaining to the role the Department 
has played in Canada's foreign intelligence operations. First, what structures has it 
established internally to deal with intelligence and how did these contribute? Second, what 
sort of intelligence operations, particularly HUMINT-related, has the Department conducted 
abroad? The thesis will selectively describe four areas of the Department's foreign 
intelligence work in the chapters from 1909 to the present day, specifically collection, 
assessment, cooperation and sharing.45 
This thesis will begin by describing Canada's current foreign intelligence community, 
and the relationship DFAIT has to the other members thereof (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 
provides a brief overview of the origins of the Department and its foreign intelligence 
capabilities and structures. In particular, this chapter will provide an outline of the 
intelligence units that have existed in the Department since the 1950s. Chapter 4 explains 
in more detail the development and operations of two departmental foreign intelligence 
structures, the Special Intelligence Section and the Interview Program. Chapter 5 describes 
two cases of the use of Canadian diplomats to collect foreign intelligence in the field - in 
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Indochina and Cuba. Finally, Chapter 6 will summarize the material presented here and 
make the basic case that the Department has been much more involved in foreign 
intelligence work than has been acknowledged. 
It should be noted, this thesis is not and cannot be a complete account of DFAIT's 
work in foreign intelligence. It can only provide a selective account of what is available in 
the public domain. It would almost certainly be an impossible task to identify all of the 
Department's work in foreign intelligence, especially when much of it remains classified. 
1.7 Methodology 
The methodology employed in this thesis is largely primary and secondary document 
analysis and personal interviews. Many of the primary documents used in this thesis are 
from the Library and Archives Canada (LAC), the Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) 
at the Department of National Defence (DND), and the DFAIT Library. The documents 
include internal histories of intelligence structures, intelligence memorandums and reports. 
The Department's annual reports, audits and directories for the past sixty years produced 
valuable "intelligence."46 The documents provide insight into the Department's operations 
and the type of intelligence work it produced. 
The secondary information used in this thesis is that written by academics and 
researchers. These publications provided both a substantial amount of valuable 
information and an indication of what is not known. 
45
 The thesis will not discuss dissemination of intelligence because much needed information cannot be found 
in the public domain. 
46
 James Eayrs recommended a review of the Department's annual reports to identify changes in the 
Department's structures over time, based on his work for The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, 
ed. Zara Steiner (Westport: Meckler Pub, 1982), in which he had an article on External Affairs. (James Eayrs 
telephone with author, July 25, 2003.) 
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This researcher also conducted interviews of individuals involved in various ways 
with the intelligence activities of the Department.47 Some of these interviewees worked in 
intelligence structures while others were at a senior administrative level. A few 
interviewees were academics who came into contact with the Department's intelligence 
structures due to their research. Most of the interviewees were referred to the author by 
Don Munton or by other interviewees, an example of the so-called "snowball" technique. 
All of the interviewees were informed of the basic guidelines for contemporary research on 
human subjects and given the opportunity to request that the interview, or parts thereof, 
be off-the-record. It should be noted that many of the interviewees were being asked 
questions about developments or work decades ago, and memory loss could have been an 
issue. In order to deal with this problem almost all interviewees were asked general 
questions about the Department's foreign intelligence work rather than detailed questions 
about specific events. The interviewees for this thesis were Allan Gotlieb, Arthur Menzies, 
Basil Robinson, Blair Seaborn, Gerry Wright, James Eayrs, John Hadwen, John Starnes, Kurt 
Jensen, Peter Johnston, and Peter Russell. 
This thesis used case study analysis to illuminate the Department's foreign 
intelligence work. These cases reflect aspects of this work but do not constitute a 
representative sampling let alone a complete picture. We will not be able, even eventually, 
to understand the Department's intelligence activities and operations without the sort of 
background information provided here and perhaps in similar future work. 
On July 8, 2003 the University of Northern British Columbia (UNBC) Research Ethics Board approved the 
ethics review for this thesis. See Appendix A. 
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Chapter Two: Canada's Foreign Intelligence Players 
The Canadian intelligence community performs all the classic functions of 
intelligence agencies and of the familiar "intelligence cycle"- it collects, assesses and 
disseminates foreign intelligence.1 It also engages in international intelligence liaison and 
cooperation.2 The intelligence community comprises a group of federal level agencies and 
departments, some but not all of which have a primary mandate in intelligence work (such 
as SIGINT or security intelligence), and some of which have a specific intelligence interest or 
mandate as part of a broader organizational mission. Canada does not have a 
comprehensive or central intelligence agency. The norm in other countries is to have one 
agency dedicated to a single form of intelligence collection (e.g. in the United States the CIA 
is the dedicated foreign intelligence agency). The members of the Canadian intelligence 
community thus must work together on many types of problems and seek consensus on 
community-wide, national and international issues, and on both operational and structural 
issues.3 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Canada does not have a clandestine foreign HUMINT 
agency. However, the Canadian intelligence community does collect foreign intelligence. 
The perception presented by academics and media is that Canada does not collect foreign 
HUMINT.4 This traditional method of foreign intelligence collection can be considered old 
1
 For more information on the intelligence cycle, see Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, Silent Warfare: 
Understanding the World of Intelligence (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2002), Chapter 1. 
2
 For further discussion on intelligence cooperation and sharing, see Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in 
Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Chapter 12. 
3
 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 305. 
Kurt F. Jensen agrees that there are misunderstandings regarding Canadian foreign intelligence capabilities. 
He states, "Misconceptions over Canadian access to foreign intelligence persist and are characteristic of the 
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technology, and often highly glamorized and publicized.5 This chapter will describe some of 
the methods that are not as well publicized, but employed by Canada to collect foreign 
intelligence. 
This chapter will describe the agencies and departments that are currently involved 
in foreign intelligence collection, assessment, dissemination, and international cooperation 
or sharing. The agencies and departments involved are the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade (DFAIT), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the 
Department of National Defence (DND) and Privy Council Office (PCO). While each of these 
engages in a different type of foreign intelligence work, all have an operational relationship 
with the Department of Foreign Affairs, the prime consumer of foreign intelligence. This 
chapter will also discuss the mandate of each of these; however, it will not trace their 
history and evolution. At the end of each section there will be a brief comparison with 
comparable intelligence agencies in allied countries, given that the Canadian intelligence 
community operates in an intelligence context. 
It is important to note that some published articles and scholarly works imply that 
the Canadian intelligence community only consists of certain government departments and 
agencies and does not include DFAIT. For example, Lieutenant-Commander Ted Parkinson in 
very limited scholarship on this facet of Canadian intelligence history. As information on this feature of 
Canadian foreign policy interests and tools becomes available, any misreading of Canadian involvement in 
foreign intelligence will diminish." (Kurt F. Jensen, Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence 1939-
1951 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 2. 
5
 Kurt F. Jensen, e-mail message to author, September 2, 2008. 
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his 2006 article on the foreign intelligence debate does not acknowledge the contributions 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs to foreign intelligence.6 
In both the media and academic literature there are preconceptions about the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. Many people are not aware of its involvement in foreign 
intelligence work or assume it merely passively receives intelligence products. The purpose 
of this thesis is to contest these assumptions and describe the reality in Canada. 
2.0 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is not usually 
considered to be one of Canada's major intelligence organizations.7 As we shall see in this 
chapter, it is in fact one of the most important. As will be shown in the following chapters, 
it has maintained an internal intelligence structure since World War II and has engaged in 
foreign intelligence operations at least since the 1940s. 
Does DFAIT even have a mandate to collect foreign intelligence? As the former 
Auditor General of Canada, L. Denis Desautels, notes in his 1996 report "the foreign 
intelligence functions carried out by...Foreign Affairs and International Trade fall within the 
general ambit of the legislation setting up those departments."8 
The 1985 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act arguably allows 
the Department to collect foreign intelligence. Section 10.1 of the>4ct, entitled "Powers, 
6
 Lieutenant-Commander Ted Parkinson, "Has the Time Arrived for a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service?" 
Canadian Military Journal 7, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 16. For other sources that understate or even ignore the 
DFAIT's work, see Jerome Mellon, "The Missing Agency: The Case for a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service" 
(master's thesis, University of Salford, 2002), <http://circ.imellon.com/docs/view.asp?id=370>; Alistair S. 
Hensler, "Creating a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service," Canadian Foreign Policy 3, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 
15-35; Hensler, "Canadian Intelligence: An Insider's Perspective," Canadian Foreign Policy 6, no. 3 (Spring 
1999): 127-132. 
7
 For a list of texts that feature intelligence functions, see Chapter 1, footnote 9. 
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Duties and Functions of the Minister," states that these powers "extend to and include all 
matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction, not by law assigned to any other 
department, board or agency of the Government of Canada, relating to the conduct of the 
external affairs of Canada, including international trade and commerce and international 
development."9 The Act does not explicitly give the Department a foreign intelligence 
mandate, but makes clear it is responsible for matters, broadly speaking, outside the 
borders of Canada and thus should be involved in all international operations of the 
government. Therefore, it can be argued that the Department is, if not responsible for 
intelligence, then at least mandated to be involved in foreign intelligence matters. 
At DFAIT, the Security and Intelligence Bureau (ISD) as of 2008 is the central unit for 
intelligence and security.10 ISD has two responsibilities: first, ensuring the security and 
safety of DFAIT personnel, infrastructure and property in other countries; and second, 
providing the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the foreign intelligence needed for policy 
development. ISD's security divisions include the Information and Technical Security 
Division (ISTD), which conducts computer security such as checking DFAIT's facilities for 
electronic (i.e., eavesdropping) devices; the Corporate Security Division (ISC), responsible 
for personnel security and advising on government-wide security policy; and the Security 
Operations and Personnel Safety Division (ISR), that deals with the physical security of 
8
 Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, The Canadian Intelligence Community: Control and 
Accountability, November 1996, <http://www.oae-bvg.ec.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9627ce.html>. 
9
 Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade ACT, 1985, c. E-22, 
<http://laws.justice.ec.ca/en/ShowTdm/cs/e-22///en>. 
10
 DFAIT generally uses symbols not acronyms to identify its divisions (e.g., ISD); however, several units are 
identified by proper acronyms. For more information, see Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (DFAIT), List of Acronyms/Symbols, April 21, 2008, 
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DFAIT facilities abroad. ISD also assists the Department to respond to crisis situations in the 
world, if necessary on a twenty-four hours a day basis; provides risk assessment for foreign 
government officials traveling to Canada; and handles expulsion of foreign diplomats. 
On the intelligence side the main division of ISD is the Foreign Intelligence Division 
(ISI). It oversees the collection, assessment/evaluation and dissemination of foreign 
intelligence, and acts as a consultant to the other parts of the department. ISI acts as a 
central hub of the Department's intelligence cooperating and sharing with other members 
of the Canadian intelligence community and allies. 
Within the federal government, the cooperation and sharing arrangements are with 
primary and secondary partners.11 The primary partners are the RCMP, CSIS, CSE, DND, 
PCO, and the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC). The secondary partners are 
Transport Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Canada Border Services 
Agency (CBSA), and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC).12 The 
primary partners share intelligence with DFAIT while the secondary partners mostly receive 
the Department's intelligence products. As the sections below will show, DFAIT has a close 
relationship in matters of foreign intelligence with each of the primary partners. 
As noted in Chapter 1, it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish the diplomatic 
reporting of Canadian embassies abroad and that of other countries from the gathering of 
intelligence. The only distinction is in the means used, not in the sort of information 
Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, A New 
Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities, 2006, <http://epe.lac-
bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher arar/07-09-
13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/EnelishReportDecl22006.pdf>, 194. 
12
 A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities, 194. 
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obtained. The Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to 
MaherArar notes this important aspect of the Department's foreign intelligence work: 
The actual number of staff who deal in "big-l" [covert] intelligence at DFAIT is small, 
and they are essentially confined to ISI [the Foreign Intelligence Division] and ISD 
[Security Intelligence Bureau]. Those who deal in small-l [open source or OSINT] 
intelligence are far more numerous, because that is the business of almost all 
geographic branches in the Department.13 
By "small l-intelligence" the Commission is referring to diplomatic reporting and open 
sources available in Canada, including the mass media. As already mentioned, foreign-
service officers (FSOs) posted abroad write diplomatic reports. Canada and its allies 
exchange these reports on a regular basis. ISI uses these various sources for preparing its 
intelligence reports. 
ISI oversees two programs that engage in gray intelligence collection of HUMINT. 
These are the Interview Program Section (ISIW) and Global Security Reporting Program 
(GSRP). ISIW debriefs Canadian citizens and others who have access to economic, political, 
social, scientific or military aspects of foreign countries. (This program is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4). The interviewed individuals have knowledge not found in Canada. This 
program does not however conduct clandestine collection. ISIW in its original form was 
created over fifty years ago and has resided in the Department for over thirty years. 
A more recently created program is the Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP) 
which involves the use of FSOs posted abroad to collect "information pertaining to security 
Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of 
the Events Relating to MaherArar: Factual Backgrounder, Vol II, 2006, <http://epe.lac-
bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher arar/07-09-
13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/Vol II English.pdf>. 580. 
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and stability issues."14 Kurt F. Jensen indicates that these FSOs "have a specific mandate 
from which deviation is not permitted."15 They operate in the same manner as other 
diplomats but with a very specific focus. FSOs under the GSRP are not burdened by the 
typical administrative work that most diplomats must complete on a daily basis. As a result, 
Jensen argues, "their reporting output is substantially greater than possible by traditional 
embassy officers."16 The number of FSOs assigned to this program is not known. 
Every country in the world has a ministry or a department responsible for foreign 
affairs and external relations. Most of these institutions handle foreign intelligence through 
very similar methods as the Department of Foreign Affairs. The counterparts of DFAIT are 
the State Department in the United States and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
in Britain, both of which perform foreign intelligence functions. The former operates the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the latter operates the Research and Analysis 
Department. Both these intelligence units provide assessments and reports about 
international problems of concern to the agency and the government. 
2.1 Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
The Royal Canadian Mounted Policy (RCMP) is Canada's federal police force. It is 
located in every province and territory. Its primary duty is to ensure the domestic peace and 
security of Canadians by enforcing federal Canadian laws. Intelligence is a vital aspect of 
RCMP investigations. It collects information "involving organized crime, high technology 
Kurt Jensen, "Toward a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service," Boutde Papier 22, no. 2 (2006): 22. 
15
 Jensen, "Toward a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service," 22. 
Jensen, "Toward a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service," 22. 
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crime and illegal migration."17 These activities do not stop at the border because they are 
all transnational in nature. For example, an organized criminal group in Canada will trade 
illicit drugs for illegal weapons across the border, and this organization will naturally make 
every attempt to conceal the movement of these weapons into Canada. The RCMP will try 
to identify and capture the individuals involved in the operation in Canada and to work with 
authorities on the other side. 
Criminal intelligence is defined as information that "the police should know in order 
to counter and apprehend those engaged in organized crime, smuggling, extortion, 
terrorism and the like."18 The difference between criminal intelligence and foreign 
intelligence is that the former focuses on specific activities of groups that disrupt the peace 
of society, while the latter broadly deals with security and foreign affairs. As Michael 
Herman says, criminal intelligence "targets the criminal rather than the crime."19 The type 
of intelligence collected by the RCMP is mostly in the HUMINT and SIGINT forms. 
The RCMP operates the Criminal Intelligence Directorate (CID) that "collects and 
analyzes intelligence to support criminal investigations."20 According to its mission 
statement the CID "is to provide a national program for the management of criminal 
information and intelligence which will permit the RCMP to detect and prevent crime 
having an organized, serious or national security dimension in Canada, or internationally as 
Canada, Privy Council Office, The Canadian Security Intelligence Community: Helping Keep Canada and 
Canadians Safe and Secure, (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2001), 6. 
18
 James Blair Seaborn, "Commentary No. 25: Intelligence and Policy: What is Constant? What is Changing?," a 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service publication, June 1994, <http://www.csis-
scrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/com45 e.html>. 
19
 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 350. 
The Canadian Security Intelligence Community, 5. 
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it affects Canada."21 Within the CID are three branches: the National Security Intelligence 
Branch (NSIB), National Security Operations Branch (NSOB) and Threat Assessment Branch. 
The NSIB is responsible for national and international assessment, coordination, monitoring 
and direction of all national security investigations and intelligence.22 The NSOB 
coordinates investigations related to security across Canada.23 The Threat Assessment 
Branch is responsible for the support of multiple areas, which include "protection of 
embassies, consulates or missions within Canada; internationally protected persons; 
airports, carriers and air routes; and the Canadian executive cadre."24 
The RCMP maintains liaison with other police forces around the world and is a 
member of Interpol, the international police organization that promotes information-
sharing to deal with transnational crime. Interpol can enact international police notices for 
persons of interest. These people are "wanted by national jurisdictions (or the international 
criminal tribunals, where appropriate) and Interpol's role is to assist the national police 
forces in identifying or locating those persons with a view to their arrest and extradition."25 
The relationship between the Department of Foreign Affairs and RCMP in the past 
has involved both cooperation and tensions, even animosity. The McDonald Commission 
noted differences between the Department and RCMP Security Service. "In some ways," the 
report says, "the tension and suspicion between the two bodies is almost inevitable: the 
Department of External Affairs is committed to an easing of international tensions based on 
co-operation and understanding; the Security Service tends to view the activities of many 
21A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities, 45. 
A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities, 96. 
3
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foreign countries with deep suspicion. The result is a difference of views on the threats to 
this country's security which originate abroad."26 Interviewees for this thesis agreed that 
the relationship between the two organizations tends to be cooperative, but they did not 
see eye to eye on some issues. The McDonald Commission notes that problems between 
two such institutions was not unique to Canada, and mentions that in other countries 
tensions exist between diplomatic and police-security structures.27 
One area of concern to both institutions was matters of persona non grata (PNG). 
This term is applied to diplomats who have violated the conditions of their positions, and 
are no longer welcomed in the host country. PNG is most often applied when persons with 
diplomatic immunity are caught spying on host soil or would be charged with a criminal 
offence were it not for the immunity. 
Peter Russell, an academic and government researcher suggests that External Affairs 
and the RCMP had differing perspectives when approaching situations that involved PNG: 
External Affairs people often thought it would be better to really keep your eye on 
these people, and find out a lot more about them and how extensive their contacts 
and networks, particularly if they had Canadians hidden away who are really spying 
for the foreign country. In other words, get the whole network instead of just as 
soon as you find a diplomat doing something that's espionage-oriented, and blowing 
the whistle and getting them sent home. External Affairs people did not think [the 
RCMP] had as long range of a view as they should have.28 
The RCMP's preference was to take action against foreign diplomats. It was focusing on the 
individuals rather than the broader context of the actions they committed. It was common 
knowledge in the Western intelligence community that the Soviet Union's intelligence and 
25
 Interpol, "Wanted," April 15, 2008, <http://www.interpol.int/Public/Wanted/Default.asp>. 
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 Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Second 
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security service, the Komityet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB), sent intelligence 
officers abroad under the guise of 'diplomats' - as do other intelligence organizations such 
as the CIA and British SIS. Soviet diplomats were particularly on the RCMP's surveillance 
watch-list. John Starnes, a retired diplomat and former head of the RCMP Security Service, 
states that the "RCMP regarded [Soviet] diplomats as the enemy."29 
The RCMP Security Service tended to demand "prompt expulsion" of an offending 
diplomat while External Affairs "either through fear that Canadian diplomats will be 
expelled in reprisal or because of the timing of a certain diplomatic initiative, has not always 
agreed to declare these diplomats persona non grata."*0 Peter Johnston states that 
situations of PNG were particularly delicate if the Canadian government was negotiating a 
trade deal with the Soviets at the same time.31 There was always the possibility if Canada 
expelled a Soviet "diplomat" that Moscow would refuse to conclude a deal.32 
The Department and RCMP did attempt to mitigate problems in the 1970s through a 
consultation process. The Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Security and 
Intelligence) and the Director General of the Security Service met regularly and discussed 
issues of concern to both the two institutions.33 It is not known how successful the 
consultation process was in resolving disputes between them.34 
Peter Russell, telephone interview with author, August 8, 2003. 
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 John Starnes, interview with author, December 10, 2003, Ottawa, Ontario. 
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Security Service. When he was at DEA there were sporadic consultations with the RCMP (Starnes, interview). 
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It is also not known whether problems still exist today between the Department and 
RCMP. In 1984, the mandate and duties of the Security Service regarding foreign diplomats 
were transferred to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), although the RCMP 
has apparently retained an interest in these and related issues. 
The Department and RCMP at present have a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) under which a senior RCMP officer is located at ISI offices to conduct liaison and 
facilitate information sharing. This individual also briefs both organizations about relevant 
issues. The liaison officer does not have direct access to DFAIT files but must request it 
from ISI officers or other division personnel. The liaison position can be seen as a 
communication and consultation channel between RCMP and DFAIT. 
All countries have agencies to collect and assess criminal intelligence. Rough 
equivalents of the RCMP are the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the 
British Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard). These agencies have the authority to 
investigate criminal activities and arrest individuals. At the same time, the FBI operates a 
specific division devoted to foreign counterintelligence operations - a function in Canada 
now given to CSIS. 
2.2 Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is Canada's civilian security 
intelligence agency.35 Its primary duty is to protect the security of Canadian society and 
investigate threats to it. The Service investigates and analyzes threats to Canada's national 
security and advises government departments and agencies about "activities which may 
30 
reasonably be suspected of constituting threats."36 CSIS was established in 1984 when the 
former RCMP Security Service was split off from the Force, a recommendation of the 
McDonald Commission. 
Section 12 of the CSIS Act broadly states: "The Service shall collect, by investigation 
or otherwise, to the extent that it is strictly necessary, and analyse and retain information 
and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of 
constituting threats to the security of Canada."37 Given this mandate for security 
intelligence, CSIS does not have a broad mandate to collect foreign intelligence such as 
information regarding the political, social, and military situation in another country. CSIS is 
empowered with a narrow mandate to collect foreign intelligence "within Canada" at the 
behest of DFAIT and National Defence under Section 16. 
The CSIS Act authorizes the Service to collect security intelligence but does not 
explicitly mandate the agency to conduct foreign intelligence operations per se. CSIS itself 
however emphasizes that its Act "was consciously drafted to contain no restriction at all 
about where the Service may collect such information."38 Therefore, CSIS can collect 
security intelligence abroad and the Service acknowledges it conducts such operations. 
In 2001, shortly after the events of 9/11, CSIS Director Ward Elcock announced to 
the Parliamentary Immigration Committee that "the reality is we do operate abroad, we do 
conduct enquiries abroad, we do conduct covert operations abroad - and in that respect, in 
35
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respect to threats to the security of Canada, [we] have essentially the same powers as . . . 
the (Central Intelligence) Agency would in the United States."39 There is no information in 
the public domain about the specific requirements that CSIS must fulfill in order for it to 
operate abroad. 
The Act defines security intelligence as simply, "threats to the security of Canada."40 
It identifies three categories of threat: political violence and terrorism; espionage and 
sabotage; and foreign-influenced activities. CSIS is not restricted to investigating these 
activities; it can, for example, also investigate transnational crime and electronic warfare.41 
CSIS uses a full range of methods of intelligence collection. It can seek information 
from the Canadian public (HUMINT). CSIS can place human sources or recruit agents in a 
theatre of operations (again, HUMINT collection). The Service also has the ability to 
conduct SIGIIMT operations such as wire-tapping (although only after receiving a judicial 
warrant). CSIS routinely uses open-sources such as media reports, academic and foreign 
publications and other documents (OSINT). It receives intelligence from other members of 
the Canadian intelligence community. CSIS can obtain intelligence from foreign 
governments and intelligence organizations. In 2004, CSIS acknowledged it had "250 
relationships with foreign agencies in approximately 140 countries."42 
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The CSIS Act specifically outlines several areas where CSIS and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs work together. Under Section 13.3, CSIS can enter into an arrangement with 
a foreign state or international organization after the Minister of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness consults the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This consultation 
process is intended to ensure that Foreign Affairs is aware and approves of CSIS' 
arrangements with a foreign government or its agencies. 
One manifestation of such CSIS foreign operations is the operation of Security 
Liaison Posts. These posts involve positioning CSIS liaison officers in foreign countries 
primarily for "the exchange of security intelligence information which concerns threats to 
the security of Canada."43 A security liaison officer (SLO) has four specific duties: "maintain 
and develop channels of communication with foreign agencies with which the Service has 
approved arrangements; carry out security screening activities in support of the 
Immigration Screening program; report to CSIS headquarters on any matter related to 
Canadian security interests; and undertake specific reliability checks as requested by the 
Mission Security Officer."44 SLOs are responsible to the Canadian ambassador and have to 
inform the ambassador about their operations. 
Section 16 of the CSIS Act allows CSIS to conduct another type of limited 
intelligence operations involving foreigners but only under certain conditions. DND or 
DFAIT can request the assistance of CSIS in collecting foreign intelligence, but only within 
Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, The CSIS Mandate, February 2004, <http://www.csis-
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Canada.45 Foreign nationals or representatives of a foreign government in Canada can be 
targeted by CSIS for collection of intelligence pertaining to "the defence of Canada or the 
conduct of the international affairs of Canada." CSIS admits that the Act does not limit its 
"collection of intelligence about threats to the security of Canada nor limits its the 
techniques." It "is restricted in its ability to collect non threat-related foreign intelligence in 
relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada."46 
Therefore, the type of intelligence it collects in Canada will greatly vary from intelligence 
collected abroad. The Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), CSIS's oversight body, 
acknowledges that CSIS has conducted a number of operations under Section 16 in the past 
two decades.47 
CSIS conducts overt and covert surveillance operations of foreign diplomats in 
Canada. The government restricts the mobility of some foreign diplomats in Canada (such 
as those from Iran, Saudi Arabia and China). They must have permission from the 
Department of Foreign Affairs if they wish to travel more than forty kilometres outside of 
their posted city. Affected diplomats must send their travel itinerary to the Department 
and "extensively document where they intend to go, how they intend to travel and why 
they are going there."48 The Department sends this information to CSIS for a security 
review and the Service advises "whether the trip is acceptable."49 CSIS does sometimes 
45
 On the CSIS - CSE MOU, see Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), SIRC Report 2001-2002: An 
Operational Audit of Canadian Security Intelligence Service, September 30, 2002, <http://www.sirc-
csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar 2001-2002-eng.pdf>. 14-15. 
CSIS, Backgrounder No. 16 - Operations Abroad. 
47
 SIRC Report 2001-2002. 
48
 Richard Cleroux, Official Secrets: The Story Behind the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Toronto: 
McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1990), 141. 
49
 Cleroux, Official Secrets, 141. 
34 
recommend prohibiting certain trips because the location is off-limits.50 Once the 
Department grants the foreign diplomat permission to travel, a CSIS office closest to the 
travel location will be alerted and may conduct surveillance of the diplomat's activities. If 
CSIS discovers the diplomat has deviated from the planned itinerary, the Department is 
informed about this occurrence and appropriate action is taken. The Department's 
response may be to expel the diplomat from Canada, to take other action, or to ignore the 
situation, depending on various factors, including the kind of activity the individual was 
involved in. 
The Department of Foreign Affairs can ask CSIS to provide background information 
about a new diplomat being sent to Canada, especially whether this diplomat has taken part 
in espionage or criminal activities in any previous postings. For instance, in January 2001, a 
Russian diplomat, Andrey Knyazev, killed an Ottawa woman and seriously injured another in 
a drinking and driving accident. The media reported that the Department of Foreign Affairs 
was aware that Knyazev had a history of drunk driving in Canada.51 The Department 
acknowledged it failed to act because diplomatic protocol was unclear in dealing with 
diplomats driving while under the influence of alcohol.52 
CSIS and the Department have a MOU which authorizes CSIS to post a liaison officer 
within DFAITat ISI. The functions of the liaison officer are similar to the RCMP liaison 
previously mentioned. The CSIS position is designed to facilitate a two-way flow of 
50
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information. As already described in this section, there are areas where CSIS and DFAIT 
work together, and one may assume the liaison officer is actively involved in facilitating this 
relationship. 
In October 2004, CSIS created the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), 
designed to encourage government departments and agencies that deal with national 
security to cooperate and share intelligence.53 The partners in ITAC are CSIS, RCMP, DFAIT, 
PSEPC, Transport Canada, CBSA, PCO, CSE, Heath Canada, Department of Justice, Canadian 
Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Environment Canada, 
Department of Finance, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC), 
Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) and Surete du Quebec (SQ).54 ITAC exchanges and shares 
threat assessment information with foreign partners, specifically the Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Centre in Britain, the National Counterterrorism Center in the United States, the 
National Threat Assessment Centre in Australia, and the Combined Threat Assessment 
Group in New Zealand.55 
The primary duty of ITAC is to "produce comprehensive threat assessments, which 
are distributed within the intelligence community and to relevant first-line responders, such 
as law enforcement, on a timely basis."56 ITAC produces classified weekly reports called 
Intelligence Digests and also a Threat Assessment Priority List that is sent to partners 
<http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication id=378241&Language 
=E&docnumber=2001/12>. 
53
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informing them on its work.57 CSIS created ITAC to try to facilitate intelligence sharing, to 
facilitate greater understanding by agencies, and to encourage more effective cooperation, 
r n 
as well as analysis. The real issue was to get people from different agencies looking at the 
same problem and to be able to access their own data banks if they thought there was 
something in them which might help find solutions to problems.59 
Most countries have a security intelligence agency similar to CSIS. In the United 
States the FBI is the national security intelligence agency. The British Security Service (MI5) 
is also primarily engaged in security intelligence. Both agencies operate domestically and 
have some representation and liaisons aboard. It thus can be assumed that CSIS interacts 
and cooperates with these agencies. 
2.3 Communications Security Establishment 
The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is Canada's offensive signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) agency and the most secretive member of the Canadian intelligence 
community. SIGINT is the collection of "radio, radar, and other electronic transmissions."60 
The predecessor of CSE, the Communications Branch of the National Research Council 
(CBNRC) was established in 1945 from SIGINT structures supporting Canada's war effort. 
For over sixty years CSE and its predecessor (Examination Unit (XU) and CBNRC) operated 
without a legislated mandate, under an Order-in-Council.61 In 2001, the Canadian 
57
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government enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act which explicitly and publicly outlined CSE's 
mandate. 
CSE has three main duties: SIGINT collection, information security (INFOSEC) and 
technical and operational assistance to federal law enforcement and security agencies.62 Its 
primary duty however is SIGINT collection of foreign signals from its bases located across 
Canada and analysis of these signals.63 Philip Rosen states that there is no definitive 
description of CSE's SIGINT operations, "upon which 80% of its budget is spent."64 CSE's 
second duty, INFOSEC operations, involves preventing "compromising emanations from 
electronic equipment," and ensuring the security of government data and 
communications.65 CSE's third duty, technical and operational assistance, involves 
supporting the work of CSIS, DFAIT, RCMP and other organizations. 
CSE's mandate places operational limits on its intelligence collection, specifically it is 
not thus authorized to direct intelligence activities at Canadians or any person in Canada.66 
However, the "Minister of National Defence may authorize CSE to intercept private 
communications in Canada." The Anti-Terrorism Act states four conditions must be 
fulfilled in order for interception of such communications: 
in the UK/USA Agreement was revealed only on 24 March 1975, in responses by the Honourable CM. Drury, 
then Minister of State for Science and Technology, to questions before the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Miscellaneous Estimates." (Rosen, The Communications Security Establishment.) 
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"(a) the interception will be directed at foreign entities located outside Canada; (b) 
the information to be obtained could not reasonably be obtained by other means; 
(c) the expected foreign intelligence value of the information that would be derived 
from the interception justifies it; and (d) satisfactory measures are in place to 
protect the privacy of Canadians and to ensure that private communications will 
only be used or retained if they are essential to international affairs, defence or 
security."68 
Although not officially acknowledged, it is widely assumed that CSE monitors the 
electronic communications of foreign embassies in Canada. According to Rosen, "CSE 
listens in to radio and telephone communications between embassies in Ottawa and their 
home countries, or between embassies and their consulates; monitors all national and 
international telephone calls; listens in to many foreign radio communications; and reads 
the electromagnetic transmissions from embassy typewriters, word processors, etc."69 CSE 
conducts such operations in order to protect Canadian security and ensure foreign 
governments are not attempting to influence domestic politics and society. 
The Department of External Affairs and its successors have had an important 
relationship with Canada's SIGINT agencies since World War II. The Department was 
involved in the establishment and operations of the Examination Unit in 1941 and later the 
successor organization, CBNRC. In the present day, the Department of Foreign Affairs 
maintains a relationship with the CSE. Located in the ISI division of the DFAIT is the Client 
68
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Relations Unit (ISIF). ISIF's mission is to disseminate "special" intelligence; it is jointly 
staffed by DFAIT and CSE.70 
CSE and the Department have at least one formal memorandum of understanding 
(MOU). The basic agreement "establishes and structures arrangements necessary to [try to] 
ensure that government institutions working together in common areas of activity, 
collaborate effectively, exchange information and do not duplicate each other's efforts."71 
The CSE-DEA MOU is technically-oriented, and discusses the establishment of a T l 
fibre optic service between the two.72 The MOU stipulates that CSE will reimburse the 
Department for the costs of using and maintaining the service.73 There is no detailed 
reference to intelligence sharing between the agency and the Department, but such activity 
can be inferred. Presumably sharing of information occurs over the fibre optic line. The 
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to MaherArar 
indicated that "the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is the CSE's 
largest intelligence client, partly because DFAIT manages Canada's foreign relations on 
behalf of all Canadian departments and agencies."74 
The Department and CSE have cooperated on so-called 'embassy collection.' Former 
CSE employee Mike Frost alleges his agency used Canadian embassies to begin collecting 
CSE has Client Relations Officers posted in several security and intelligence agencies and departments, in 
order to make available SIGINT material which is carefully controlled. {A New Review Mechanism for the 
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71
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SIGINT in the 1970s. He explains that the government sent CSE officers abroad under the 
cover of an 'employee of National Defence,' and gave them a diplomatic passport and 
immunity.75 Canadian ambassadors in the target country were informed about the embassy 
operation in a joint CSE-Foreign Affairs meeting in Ottawa, or informed by a CSE officer 
conducting a survey of the site for its potential in embassy collection.76 (It is a standard 
departmental procedure to inform the ambassador of everything Canadian government 
departments or agencies do in a country.) These SIGINT operations differ from CSE's 
previously discussed embassy collection in Canada, in that the embassy is used as a base 
instead of being the target. 
It is not known whether CSE still conducts these operations in the present day, but it 
seems highly likely. Officially the Department and CSE do not acknowledge they conduct 
such operations, for obvious reasons of secrecy and because they violate international law, 
specifically Article 3.1(d) and 27.1 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to 
which Canada is a signatory.77 Under Article 27.1, countries are required to have consent 
from the host government to set up a wireless transmitter/receiver on embassy's premises. 
Needless to say such permission is rarely requested. 
Secrecy limits the release of information on the Department's relationship with CSE. 
One interviewee for this thesis, Allan Gotlieb, a former under-secretary (deputy minister) 
for External Affairs, nevertheless acknowledged the existence of embassy collection. "I'm 
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not clear [as] to what is disclosed and how much is known under the Official Secrets Act," 
Gotleb stated, "but you know there is the Communications [Security] Establishment, which 
is a passive receiver of electronic intelligence and embassies do play a role [and] in that 
respect in terms of facilities or may play such a role."78 Notably, Gotlieb's name is 
mentioned in Frost's book in relation to CSE's embassy collection. In the late 1970s, when 
CSE began its first foray into embassy collection it needed to enlist the support of External 
Affairs. The official approached, according to Frost, happened to be Gotlieb.79 
SIGINT agencies in allied countries include the American National Security Agency 
(NSA) and the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). All these SIGINT 
agencies have one common trait; they are very secretive about their duties and operations. 
Furthermore, SIGINT agencies tend to be the largest and most expensive intelligence 
organizations operated by governments. The costs reflect not only the scale of such 
operations but also the rapid development of information technology, which has required 
upgrading SIGINT and cryptographic technology. As discussed briefly in the next chapter, all 
cooperate and are inter-connected under the terms of the so-called "UK-USA" agreement. 
2.4 Department of National Defence 
The Department of National Defence (DND) is the central authority for the command 
and control of Canada's military forces. With respect to intelligence, DND focuses "largely 
on foreign based threats, and military capabilities and operations."80 The military and 
foreign intelligence it collects is both "tactical—relating to the disposition of the enemy's 
Allan Gotlieb telephone interview with author, September 23, 2003. 
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troops and equipment in the field—[and] strategic, relating to longer-term capabilities in 
the light of total military strength and the capacity to maintain it."81 DND also collects and 
analyzes intelligence on domestic threats, most often employing military police in 
conjunction and cooperation with the RCMP and/or CSIS. 
Relatively recently, circa 2001, an internal National Defence report warned that 
budget cuts had "caused an erosion in the intelligence-staffing capability."82 David Charters 
suggests that this weakness was in fact a chronic problem.83 Since then, however, the 
Department appears to have taken some pains to demonstrate that it is focussed on and 
augmenting its intelligence capabilities.84 
The Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) coordinates the collection of intelligence for 
DND. Under the CDI is the Director General of Intelligence Division (J2 Intelligence 
Directorate) that provides military intelligence "on issues involving the use or potential use 
of the Canadian Forces abroad."85 J2 is an assessment unit for political and military 
information, and operates twenty-four hours a day. 
National Defence operates a large and sophisticated intelligence capability that 
collects various types of intelligence, especially HUMINT, SIGINT, and imagery intelligence 
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(IMINT).86 DND has a unit devoted to the collection of battlefield IMINT via airplanes and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) - a capability upgraded by the Harper government. 
In 2008, the Canadian media discovered that DND operates a secret HUMINT unit in 
theatres of operations. This unit is called the Human Intelligence Company. The CBC 
reported that this unit was established so that the CF could "gather information on overseas 
missions in places like Afghanistan."87 Soldiers in this company are trained to collect and 
analyze information from a wide variety of human sources, which could be contacts on the 
streets or other people they encounter. The unit questions and debriefs individuals in 
order to understand activities and the operational situation in a region. The Human 
Intelligence Company can recruit and oversee spy networks made up of local intelligence 
agents.89 DND will not confirm the number of personnel and operational budget of the unit. 
It did acknowledge that this unit has been working in Afghanistan since CF began operations 
in the country. 
The Canadian Forces Information Operations Group (CFIOG) and the Canadian 
Forces SIGINT Operations Centre (CFSOC) are the principal DND SIGINT organizations. "The 
CFIOG has a mandate for SIGINT intelligence activities delegated by the CSE, which include 
support to domestic and international military operations."90 The CFSOC is tasked with the 
analytical responsibilities.91 DND may intercept private communications and foreign 
Imint is the collection of intelligence information via satellite and aerial photography. 
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intelligence that begins or ends in Canada, but only to assist security agencies and under 
their direction.92 
Details of the present intelligence relationship between the DND and DFAIT are not 
publicly available. In the past, however, the two institutions worked closely in the area of 
intelligence. The case study in Chapter 4 on the Special Intelligence Section describes one 
joint operation. Military attaches also have a role in intelligence work. 
A military attache is unique within the diplomatic system. The duties of an attache 
tend to be information collection and reporting, advising the ambassador about military 
issues, assisting in the acquisition or selling of military equipment and representing the 
government at diplomatic functions. The primary purpose of a military attache, however, is 
intelligence collection. Pawel Monat, a Polish military attache who defected to the United 
States, describes the position in these terms: "in every land and language, the term military 
attache is only a synonym for spy."93 
Alfred Vagts, author of The Military Attache, argues that "a great deal of information 
about the armies, navies, air forces and war potentials of foreign countries can readily be 
obtained...from service manuals, parliamentary reports and other papers."94 In short, it is 
OSINT. Vagts1 statement is valid in countries that have an openness of information. In such 
places where information tends not to be published or is heavily censored, the military 
attache will have more difficulty. 
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Historically, military attaches had a significant role in the diplomacy of nations. For 
instance, in 1890 France began using smokeless powder in its munitions and the French War 
Minister decided to exclude all foreign attaches from observing its army's operations.95 
Consequently, the German military attache indicated that the Kaiser would likely retaliate 
by excluding French attache from German military operations, which would have inevitably 
created problems for French-German relations.96 The War Minister worried about French 
media criticizing the government for allowing foreign attaches to observe secret testing.97 
Nevertheless, the tests "were to be so large a scale" that any methods of concealment 
would be ineffective, and allowing access would ease French-German relations.98 Vagts 
explains the primary assumption was to "let them learn something about us so that we can 
learn even more about them."99 Thus, the reasoning that underlies the exchange of military 
attaches is essentially the idea of quid pro quo, the same principle that underlies 
intelligence cooperation in general. (See Chapter One.) 
A confidential Canadian (Department of External Affairs) memorandum explicitly 
outlined the role of a Canadian military attache for both diplomatic and intelligence work. 
The document states DND began to "bring our [attache] procedures in line with British and 
United States practice" in 1946, specifically in the "appointment, training, duties and 
administration" of military attaches.100 The alignment was to ensure that all three countries 
had compatibilities and interoperability in their attache operations throughout the world. 
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At the same time, DND indicated that every military attache would be effectively trained for 
the duty, and have the necessary foreign language training needed for the post.101 
DEA realized the use of Canadian military attaches was to provide "the Canadian 
government a direct source of information concerning the organizations, progress and value 
of military forces and military resources" of the host country.102 A military attache must 
keep informed about the economic and political situation in the country, in order to 
understand the context in which its military operates, as well as about current military 
developments.103 In another memorandum DND specifically indicated the duties of 
Canadian military attaches. The first duty, as accredited diplomats, was to represent their 
own military service in the country they are posted. The second duty was "to avoid any 
suspicion that they are endeavouring to secure secret information through illicit means." 
Furthermore, the "attaches must have no relations whatever with persons acting or 
professing to act as spies or secret agents," because of the danger of an attache being 
placed into a compromising situation.104 
Canadian military attaches have other duties that are linked to the first two. They 
are required to create relations "with the corresponding service and with any other persons 
or organizations which may assist [them] in acquiring information."105 Attaches must "take 
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every opportunity" to observe and visit any military exercise or facility to determine the 
"standard of the equipment and training which prevails in the corresponding service."106 
A military attache receives a list of subjects to observe-specific types of information 
requested by intelligence officials in Ottawa.107 Before departing for any official visit to a 
military centre or theatre of operations, an attache was supposed to inquire if there was 
any specific information needed by the Director of Intelligence.108 
Military attaches were required to follow stringent protocols to avoid being declared 
persona non grata (PNG). An attache must complete applications to visit facilities and 
theatres of operations, if necessary, as well as notify local commanders. An attache was not 
ask for classified information "unless instructed to do so by his Director of Intelligence." The 
same caution applied to visiting "confidential practices or experiments," since the host 
country could ask its attache to do the same in Canada. Military attaches are expected to 
make informal contacts with military personnel, from whom they can acquire "background 
knowledge for an appreciation of the general views prevailing in the Armed Forces of the 
foreign country." DND also requests military attaches to establish acquaintances with non-
service officials, individuals who did not work in any of the military institutions but 
interacted with those who did.109 
On December 13,1946 the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), a community wide 
committee that doubt with intelligence assessments, wrote a secret memorandum on the 
requirements needed prior to posting any military attache. The posting of an attache must 
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take into consideration the "overall intelligence policy," and the demands of the military 
divisions. JIC recognized that Canada could not develop a world-wide network for 
intelligence collection, nor "compete with the United Kingdom and the United States" in 
such work.n o JIC believed that any expansion of attaches must be relative to the 
development of intelligence capacities in Ottawa, for example, the ability to do analysis of 
raw information.111 JIC expected that the personnel who filled attache positions would be 
"capable of obtaining intelligence results." It is counterproductive to select "officers by 
reason only of their seniority in the Service."112 
What was the DEA view on deploying military attaches? The under-secretary in 
1946 was Lester B. Pearson, and "he agreed with the principle set out in the [DND] paper, 
namely that the reason for appointing Service Attache was for intelligence."113 Although, he 
did disagree with some of the specific postings put forward by the Forces and by JIC, based 
on the view that there was insufficient reasoning for certain postings.114 In 1950, the Chief 
of Staff conducted a review of attache positions, and the Minister of National Defence 
presented a report to the Cabinet Defence Committee. One of the major concerns of the 
Chief of Staff was, interestingly enough, "the need to perform independent Canadian 
assessments of the validity of United Kingdom and United States intelligence, particularly 
Memorandum, "Report on the Requirements for Service Attache Post," sections marked "Secret," 
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where they disagree."115 Another concern was that an attache from one military service 
could not do the work of another.116 For example, a naval attache would not be able to 
understand fully the intricacies of air force operations. Thus, separate attaches 
representing the different services might be required. 
At one time the Chief of Intelligence and Security (CIS) within DND conducted 
administrative and training for military attaches.117 Presently, the Deputy Chief of Defence 
Staff (DCDS) has those responsibilities.118 In 1990, Canada had military attaches in twenty-
one countries and attaches were accredited to a total of forty-two. In 2008, military 
attaches were posted in thirty-two countries and accredited to one hundred and forty-
one.119 The increase in numbers clearly indicates a growing and continuing importance of 
military attaches in diplomacy and intelligence. 
To summarize, Canadian military attaches represent our government and military 
institutions, but unlike diplomats deployed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, their duty 
to collect HUMINT is an understood part of their daily operations. Despite the fall of the 
Soviet Union in 1990, the placement of attaches has continued and increased. As long as 
Canada takes part in UN peacekeeping operations, produces military technology, and 
maintains membership in defence coalitions there will always be a need for military 
attaches for this country. 
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In the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD), as is well-known, conducts 
extensive military and foreign intelligence operations. The DoD does not have one single 
intelligence structure for collection and assessment, but rather several organizations: the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (the prime assessment agency), Army Intelligence and 
Security Command (INSCOM), Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), US Marine Corps 
Intelligence, and Air Intelligence Agency (AIA). The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) similarly 
provides such intelligence for British forces and the British government. A key arm is the 
Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). 
2.5 Privy Council Office 
The Privy Council Office (PCO) is the central agency of the Canadian government. 
The PCO "provides non-partisan advice and support to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and 
Cabinet committees."120 In the area of intelligence, its role is to determine intelligence 
priorities, promote effective coordination among the intelligence community and assist 
agencies and departments in "proposing] strategic priorities to ministers."121 
The PCO has two intelligence-related units that provide support to the government: 
the Security Intelligence Secretariat and the International Assessment Staff (IAS). In 2005, 
the Conservative government established the National Security Advisor (NSA), as the title 
implies, is the senior advisor to the Prime Minister and Cabinet on national security matters. 
He or she provides advice on foreign policy and security issues and coordinates the activities 
of the security and intelligence community. He or she is also the Deputy Minister 
The Canadian Security Intelligence Community, 13. 
A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities, 196. 
51 
(responsible for policy direction) for the CSE and ITAC.122 In addition, the NSA has a 
relationship with allied governments. 
The Security Intelligence Secretariat is an advisory unit to the prime minister and 
governmental departments, and to "ministerial decision-making on security and intelligence 
matters."123 IAS produces assessment reports on international conditions and possible 
implications for Canada. The focus is "on countries that are authoritarian, unstable, 
involved in conflict, or for other reason, are of concern to Canada and the international 
community."124 IAS analysts work with "all source" intelligence to produce their assessment 
reports. These sources can be open and public (such as the media and academic 
publications), or classified such as diplomatic reports, HUMINT and SIGINT material. The 
unit also receives and employs intelligence assessments from allies. 
From 1985 to 1989, Blair Seaborn, a former Canadian ambassador and was the 
Intelligence and Security Coordinator at PCO (the forerunner position to that of the NSA). 
Part of his job was to chair the Intelligence Advisory Committee.125 He regarded the 
Department of Foreign Affairs intelligence work as very important to the Canadian 
intelligence community. "The contribution made by the Department...was extremely 
valuable. They had a damn good analytical shop in External Affairs, as they did in the 
Department of National Defence." Those were the two main contributors to the writing of 
our reports... the main contributors to the end product."126 
A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities, 197. 
The Canadian Security Intelligence Community, 14. 
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In 1993, the government moved the bulk of the intelligence assessment staff of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs to the PCO's IAS (prior to the changeover the IAS was a co-
ordinating secretariat). The IAS was henceforth to provide centralized analysis. Some 
experts concluded that the Department "[was] left with virtually no intelligence analysis 
capacity."127 The rationale behind this transfer may have been to save money,128 but the 
move may also have been guided by the notion that a central agency like the PCO or 
another intelligence agency was the place where most of the intelligence assessment 
should be done. This view is disputed by other experts, who argue that intelligence 
assessment is best done close to the substantive expertise and to the potential users of the 
intelligence.129 
Intelligence coordination is a major role of the PCO. The Clerk of the Privy Council 
chairs a deputy minister-level group called the Interdepartmental Committee on Security 
and Intelligence (ICSI). It "discusses strategic policy and resources issues, considers 
sensitive national security matters, reviews proposals destined for Cabinet and 
recommends the annual intelligence priorities" for the intelligence community.130 The 
Assistant Secretary for Security and Intelligence at PCO chairs the Intelligence Policy Group 
(IPG), an assistant deputy minister (ADM) level group from across the Canadian government 
and intelligence community. The IPG provides a "forum for policy and operational 
127
 Christopher Spencer, "Intelligence Analysis under Pressure of Rapid Change: The Canadian Challenge," 
Journal of Conflict Studies 16, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 
<http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=S96/articles/&filename=spencer.htm>. One of these 
experts, Stuart Farson, believes the Department's numbers have since been replenished. (Stuart Farson, e-mail 
to author, May 23, 2003.) 
128
 Stuart Farson, "Is Canadian Intelligence Being Re-invented?" Canadian Foreign Policy 6, no.2 (Winter 1999): 
59. 
Confidential source, interview with author. 
53 
coordination within the community."131 The Executive Director of IAS chairs the Intelligence 
Assessment and Coordination Committee (IACC), made up of representatives from various 
government departments and agencies that deal with intelligence. The purpose of IACC is 
to "produce papers that take a longer-range view of foreign developments, but are still of 
immediate interest to decision-makers."132 PCO and Foreign Affairs had a MOU under which 
both institutions provide personnel and management for the IAS. 
While most countries see a need for intelligence to be centralized they do not 
always pursue this goal in identical ways. The closest equivalent to Canada's PCO with 
respect to intelligence functions is to be found in the United Kingdom, where the key body 
is the Joint Intelligence Committee that reports to the prime minister and cabinet. In the 
United States, the director of the CIA used to be simultaneously the "Director of Central 
Intelligence" (DCI) and in theory responsible for intelligence coordination across the 
American intelligence community. In Washington, however, the various intelligence 
agencies are notoriously autonomous, at least as autonomous as most other American 
government departments. The DCI was thus often unable to provide genuine coordination. 
In the aftermath of 9/11, and the report of the 9/11 Commission,133 President George W. 
Bush created the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), a position intended to 
provide greater centralization and coordination of intelligence. The DNI was however not 
richly endowed with resources to achieve this goal. The "jury" of intelligence experts and 
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practitioners is still out on whether or not this modest restructuring is going to make a 
difference. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of Canada's current foreign intelligence 
community. It should be clear that Canada has a substantial structure for collecting, 
assessing and disseminating intelligence. The fact that Canada does not have a dedicated 
foreign clandestine HUMINT agency clearly does not prevent the classic functions of foreign 
intelligence from being performed. It should also be clear from this chapter that the 
Department of Foreign Affairs itself has both an internal intelligence capability and a 
prominent and central role in the overall Canadian intelligence community -- capabilities 
and a role most often overlooked in discussions of the Department and Canadian foreign 
policy. The following chapter will describe the Department's early involvement in foreign 
intelligence work. 
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Some of the information that a foreign ministry needs to function comes from sensitive 
sources. 
-John Hadwen1 
Chapter Three: Departmental Intelligence Structures 
The previous chapter described the roles of the components of the present day 
Canadian intelligence community, including those of the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
Several questions arise from that chapter. When did the Department begin collecting 
intelligence? How did the Department organize its intelligence structures and how did they 
evolve over the post World War II period? This chapter attempts to provide answers to 
these questions. It briefly describes the intelligence structures created in the Department 
over a half century. Information about these structures has not previously been available, 
and the purpose of this chapter is to provide some understanding of the Department's 
intelligence units. (Chapters Four and Five will provide some illustration of the intelligence 
operations, including intelligence collection, in which the Department has engaged in the 
postwar period.) Generally, this chapter and subsequent ones will show that the 
Department is and has been much more involved in foreign intelligence work than is 
acknowledged in public or has been shown in the existing academic literature or 
government publications.2 
1
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3.0 Early Years 
Before exploring "how" the Department organized itself for intelligence work, we 
must first understand the conditions that prompted the development of such capabilities. 
There is little information available about the Department's intelligence capabilities prior to 
1940. As a result, no specific case studies can be presented about this early period. Yet one 
must understand the Department's role at that time. 
Confederation in 1867 did not provide Canada with the full sovereign authority of an 
independent country or with the necessary structures to conduct external relations. At the 
time, Great Britain still managed the foreign relations of the dominions. It would not be 
until the 1931 Statute of Westminster that Canada legally had authority to decide its own 
foreign policy. In these early years, therefore, there was no urgency to create a department 
for external affairs. Nevertheless, Canada did pursue its own foreign interests in several 
instances in the 1870s, for example with fishing treaty negotiations (while under the 
supervision of the British). 
The need for "small l-intelligence" in diplomatic relations was recognized when 
Great Britain and Canada were dealing with the United States in the Alaskan boundary 
dispute of 1899. Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier asked Joseph Pope, a senior public servant, 
to prepare the government's case in the boundary dispute. Pope would quickly learn that 
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the government lacked basic information about vital Canadian interests.3 At that time, 
Canada was a passive receiver of British intelligence but had little capacity and no formal 
structures for collation, assessment and analysis let alone collection of intelligence. When 
Pope gained access to some information from officials at the British Foreign Office they 
insisted the documents were for "personal use" and that he return them to London and 
"not to pass them on to [his] successor."4 In another situation, a US State Department 
official assisting Pope with finding information on the Russian occupation of Alaska became 
apprehensive about providing Pope with documentation.5 This individual believed his 
actions might be considered treasonable. 
Pope later proposed that the Canadian government create a department to manage 
Canada's external relations.6 All diplomatic despatches would be referred to this 
department, and its staff would analyze international issues concerning the country.7 Pope 
suggested that if a new department could not be created, the responsibilities should be 
given to the secretary of state.8 
Prime Minister Laurier responded by establishing the Department of External Affairs 
(DEA) in 1909 to handle Canada's growing involvement in international relations. At a 
minimum, the government needed clerical work to collect and file information from abroad. 
As James Eayrs, the author of The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in 
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Canada, explains, the establishment of the Department was a result of a need for organized 
and comprehensive information to guide early Canadian foreign policy.9 At the time, the 
government did not have what Sherman Kent calls basic descriptive intelligence, "the 
groundwork which gives meaning to day-to-day change and the groundwork without which 
speculation into the future is likely to be meaningless."10 The first head of the Department, 
Joseph Pope, sought to rectify that situation. While the very creation of External Affairs in 
1909 was itself a reflection of a perceived need for what could be considered foreign 
intelligence, Eayrs notes that "it was only slowly that Canadian governments came to 
appreciate the intimate connection of intelligence...and the quality of their external 
affairs."11 
External Affairs, once established, did not instantaneously produce copious 
intelligence for Ottawa policy-makers. DEA produced no intelligence before the late 1930s. 
The government needed to establish embassies around the world to collect information.12 
Even by the late 1930s to early 1940s the Department only had half dozen missions in the 
world and a very small staff in Ottawa. 
3.1 Intelligence in World War II 
When Nazi Germany invaded Poland in 1939, it began World War II. Japan's 
aggressive advances in Asia to expand its empire had begun in the late-1930s but war in the 
Pacific is usually seen as beginning with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The 
war mobilized all available resources (i.e. human, economic, technological, industrial, and 
9
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military). The war had a significant affect on allied countries. In particular, it prompted a 
high degree of cooperation and sharing on both the military and intelligence fronts. The 
allies needed to coordinate and share in many areas, including "human intelligence, signals 
intelligence, ocean surveillance, photographic aerial intelligence and...the production of 
intelligence estimates."13 This wartime cooperation and sharing was the beginning of 
intelligence agreements arranged over the next several decades. 
3.2 Intelligence in World War II: Censorship and Debriefing 
The overall activities and role of External Affairs greatly developed in World War II, 
including foreign intelligence activities. During the war, intelligence structures gathered 
information from censorship activities. The British had informed the Canadian government 
that its newspapers might contain information that could be useful to the enemy and 
needed to be "censored."14 The British also advised DEAthat "intercepting] messages, if 
properly organized and analyzed," had great potential as intelligence information.15 In 
other words, "it was the collation and evaluation of many pieces of seemingly insignificant 
information that held the potential for shedding light on conditions in enemy territories or 
on details of enemy war fighting dogma."16 The government however lacked an organized 
system to coordinate the activities of censoring and analyzing the mail of prisoners of war 
(POWs) as well as that of others. 
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In the departmental history, John Hilliker states that the government began by 
creating an interdepartmental committee "to direct and harmonize censorship activities."17 
There were several departments conducting censorship activities. "The army was 
responsible for telegraph censorship, the Post Office looked after postal censorship, and 
National War Services carried out press censorship."18 These activities, as Jensen indicates, 
"were hampered by an absence of central focus. No one seemed to be in charge."19 
The DEA was not directly responsible for censorship activities, but became involved 
in the planning and policy direction because of the potential for intelligence information. 
Jensen notes that the DEA "was not an enthusiastic participant in actual censorship."20 
Tommy Stone, an External Affairs official who came to specialize in intelligence, developed 
many of the Department's intelligence structures and methods including its role in 
censorship. Stone instigated a systematic approach "whereby censorship workers sorted 
out the intercepts as they came in and put them in appropriate files."21 The intercepts the 
various departments handled were not signals intelligence (SIGINT) related, but rather mail 
that was sent by or destined for German and other POWs interned in Canada and mail 
entering and leaving Canada in general. 
The censorship activities analyzed the mail of POWs, even though such operations 
were illegal under the Geneva Convention.22 It was learned that German censors were "lax 
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in scrutinising airmail" being sent to POWs held in Canada.23 Such letters provided 
intelligence about the effectiveness of allied bombings, insights into German morale, and 
even logistical information about paralyzed German U-boats.24 This intelligence also 
allowed the allies to determine the "thrust and weakness of enemy propaganda that 
needed to be countered."25 
The Department's intelligence operation did not employ particularly sophisticated 
methods for handling and destroying POW mail. "On one occasion," Hilliker explains, 
"junior officers had to be deployed on Parliament Hill to rescue intercepts blown about 
when an unexpected updraft in an East Block fireplace sent them swirling up the chimney 
before they could be burned."26 
Around the end of 1941, G. P. de T. Glazebrook took over the work of Stone. He 
recommended a centralized supervision of the work, because many departments were 
involved in censorship activities.27 In 1942, the Cabinet War Committee appointed Colonel 
0. M. Biggar as the director of censorship in order to supervise the various jurisdictions 
28 
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"German morale and impartiality of neutral countries" from the information that was 
collected from censoring mail.29 Hilliker claims that DEA relied "considerably" on these 
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reports, but mostly in areas of particular concern for the Department.30 He does not 
specifically list areas of concern, but mentions the French islands of Saint Pierre et Miquelon 
off Newfoundland as examples.31 
The DEA and National Defence also had responsibility for debriefing German 
soldiers (for HUMINT) captured by the allies and sent to Canada for internment. Historian 
Don Page indicates that both Stone and Glazebrook "appreciated how information derived 
from POWs could be used for intelligence and propaganda."32 
One purpose of the debriefing operations was to search for collaborators among the 
POWs. Some of them were willing to write and broadcast propaganda messages for the 
allies. External Affairs and National Defence "educated" POWs about democratic principles, 
making them more valuable in psychological warfare. The hope was that these individuals 
would "encourage surrender, discount Axis propaganda and foster collaboration for allied 
psychological warfare."33 Some POWs had strong convictions and resisted attempts to 
change. Page notes that 3,220 people were identified who could not be "educated" due to 
their ideological convictions.34 Page suggests, that "by taking an active part in political 
warfare, Stone hoped that External Affairs would become privy to valuable intelligence 
about European developments that it would not otherwise receive."35 
In addition to debriefing German POWs held in Canada, External Affairs (in 
coordination with National Defence) also on several occasions coordinated debriefings of 
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repatriated Canadians who had been held in Europe or Asia. The first debriefings were 
conducted in the summer of 1942 with nine Canadian women returning from Europe.36 
These women provided information regarding "the general dissatisfaction among German 
Christians toward the Nazi regime...the quality and availability of commodity items for 
civilians, [and] the impact of the early bombings on the German people."37 Canadians 
returning from Asia were also debriefed in New York, under the direction of Lester B. 
Pearson, the senior Canadian diplomat in Washington, DC. These interviewees were 
missionaries and diplomats who had been working in North and South China, Hong Kong, 
Manchuria, Indochina, Japan and Korea.38 The interviewees provided information about 
Japanese military deployment and logistical operations in the various regions.39 
In another case, DEA and National Defence sent a military intelligence officer and 
Herbert Norman, a Canadian diplomat repatriated from Japan, to Rio de Janeiro to join a 
ship, the SS Gripsholm, which was returning from Japan bound for New York.40 The 
Gripsholm had Canadians on board and the DND officer and Norman were dispatched to 
debrief them.41 This program, essentially a specialized HUMINT operation ended quickly 
after all Canadians were repatriated. 
3.3 Postwar Development and Expansion 
As noted earlier, initially the Department's intelligence work consisted of very simple 
clerical work, basically collation and filing of information received from abroad. During the 
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1940s, DEA's intelligence work began to change and evolve because of the demands World 
War II was placing on the government and the need to cooperate and share intelligence 
with allies. Canada's geography also provided an advantage, allowing its wartime 
intelligence effort to include collection of information from a wide area that included the 
Asia-Pacific, South America and parts of Europe. Canada's involvement in the war would set 
a precedent for the future development of Canada's overall intelligence structures and 
methods. 
Canada's foreign policy expanded in the post-war era. There was at the same time a 
greater need for foreign intelligence to support the government's initiatives. The 
emergence of the Cold War and the political divide between East and West impelled Canada 
into providing greater assistance to its Western allies in the struggle against Communist 
expansion in the international system. External Affairs needed foreign intelligence 
structures to support Canadian policy initiatives. The allies saw a need to extend foreign 
intelligence collection, assessment, and sharing into the post-war years, which resulted in 
Canada joining several intelligence agreements. 
In 1948 Canada joined a very secretive multilateral security and intelligence sharing 
and cooperation arrangement known as the UKUSA Agreement. Its members are the 
United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Martin Rudner 
suggests that the primary goal of UKUSA, which still exists, is "cooperation in sharing of 
SIGINT technologies, in targeting and operational matters, and in exchange of foreign 
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intelligence collection."42 The key national intelligence agencies thus currently involved are 
the US National Security Agency (NSA), Great Britain's Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Australia's 
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) and the New Zealand Government Communications 
Security Bureau (GCSB). The UKUSA "is not a single treaty document but rather a set of 
Anglo-American agreements, Memoranda of Understanding and exchanges of letters."43 
Canada is also involved in many foreign intelligence arrangements related to or developed 
from UKUSA, virtually all of which are secret. Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball state 
"there are numerous other agreements, both multilateral and bilateral, which govern the 
exchange of intelligence information between these countries. Moreover, there are 
unwritten agreements, based on convention and working practice, which in many cases are 
just as important as the written agreements."44 It is believed that External Affairs actively 
contributed to these agreements because of its responsibility for Canada's external 
relations, and representation of the Canadian intelligence community internationally. 
As a result of the new and expanded demands of the postwar era, the Canadian 
government expanded its foreign intelligence capabilities. Some new foreign intelligence 
structures were created within External Affairs and National Defence. Others involved DEA 
as an active participant and manager of foreign intelligence activities. 
During this period, the Department became actively involved in development and 
organization of many important foreign intelligence structures. A key foreign intelligence 
42
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coordinating body was the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) based in National Defence -
modelled after the similar British structure. Little has been written about the Canadian JIC 
and it is sufficient for present purposes to note that it met weekly and "approved 
assessments of information from all sources bearing on events currently happening or likely 
to happen in the near future/' of concern to the government.45 The JIC had representatives 
from various other agencies and departments and its chair was a representative from 
External Affairs. 
Under the direction of the JIC was the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB). 46 The JIB had 
four foreign intelligence related duties. One was "to collect and collate the information 
required for defence purposes."47 Second, it was to provide information for Canadian 
military operational planning.48 Third, it was to "collect, collate, and provide information on 
the topography, communications, economic and industrial war potential of foreign 
countries as required by the various intelligence and planning staffs."49 Finally, the JIB was 
to access "all available Canadian sources of overt information on foreign countries" not 
under the existing authority of any other intelligence agency in Canada.50 
The Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) was another structure under the JIC. The JIS was a 
community-wide intelligence assessment unit that periodically made assessment reports.51 
Peter Johnston, Cooper's Snoopers and Other Follies: Fragments of a Life (Victoria: Trafford Publishing, 
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The JIS was considered a "virtual organization" because it had no permanent staff. The 
DEA was an active participant in the JIB and JIS as well as the JIC. 
3.4 Defence Liaison 2 (DL2) 
In November of 1948, External Affairs established the Defence Liaison Division (DL) 
to co-ordinate defence policy and foreign intelligence matters with other departments and 
allies. The acting under-secretary of state for external affairs, Escott Reid, at the time was 
involved in negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and he advocated 
the creation of a liaison division with the military. DL was designed to provide liaison with 
other departments,53 particularly with National Defence, and to promote "policy co-
ordination in this vital area," reducing "the disarray that existed at the time."54 Reid was 
delighted with the development of the Defence Liaison division, noting that "one minor 
advantage of the present system is that it provides 'cover' for the more secret security and 
intelligence work."55 In other words, DL's name, did not suggest its intelligence functions.51 
The director of DL had a greater role than simply overseeing and operating the 
division; this individual was also the chairman of or representative on many community-
wide intelligence and security committees.57 For example, Harry Carter states that "the 
Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 148. 
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 The above noted memo from Reid to Heeney noted G.G. Crean, a departmental employee, conducted a 
survey of the Department's overall intelligence work in the summer of 1949. 
In 1961, Defence Liaison assisted the Department with several key government committees, in some 
instances by representing the Department or providing appropriate information. These committees included 
the Joint Planning Staff, Panel on Economic Aspects of Defence Questions, Sub-Panel on the Economic Aspects 
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head of Defence Liaison sat by invitation on the Joint Planning Committee, a sub-committee 
of the Chiefs of Staff" at National Defence, and occasionally was the chairman of the 
committee.58 The Joint Planning Committee prepared "studies on current and future 
strategic and operational problems."59 The Head of DL was also the chairman of the JIC. 
Shortly after the establishment of DL, in December 1948, Evan Benjamin Rogers, a 
foreign-service officer in the Department's Information Office, proposed the creation of a 
political and economic intelligence unit for the Department while conducting a study of 
psychological warfare. "It occurred to me," he said, "that both psychological and economic 
warfare would require an intelligence organization, and that, as they be drawing a good 
deal of information from the same sources, it might be economical to establish a joint 
intelligence organization."60 His proposal contained detailed information about the 
structure, the organization of files, and the sharing of information with other departments 
and agencies.61 At the time of Rogers' memorandum, the Department was undergoing a 
massive restructuring. Rogers' proposal was however a reflection of the Department's 
growing needs for a specialized and separate division to handle foreign intelligence work. 
In 1949 External Affairs decided to separate DL into two divisions, due in part to 
increasing work-load. What became known as Defence Liaison 1 (DL1) conducted liaison 
with National Defence, the United States and NATO. Defence Liaison 2 (DL2) was 
Planning, Dew Line Coordinating Committee, and Permanent Joint Board on Defence and Canada-United 
States Committee on Joint Defence. 
58
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responsible for security and intelligence matters. Robert A. MacKay became the head of 
DL1, while Gordon Gale (Bill) Crean became the head of DL2. 
One DL2 veteran, Peter Johnston, indicates that it was "a central point of storage of 
intelligence and exchange of intelligence" between External Affairs and other departments 
and agencies, especially the JIC.62 DL2 did not actually collect intelligence. Raw intelligence 
as well as processed intelligence came from Canadian diplomats abroad (through political 
and other reporting), from the broader Canadian intelligence community and from Canada's 
allies. 
DL2 had a relationship with the Communications Branch of the National Research 
Council (CBNRC), the predecessor of CSE, and thus some responsibility for Canadian signals 
intelligence. During the 1950s and 1960s the CBNRC received policy direction from the 
head of DL2, who was also the "Director of Communications Security" (DCS).63 In fact the 
DCS out ranked the director of CBNRC in issues relating to operations. The DCS provided 
guidance on the targets CBNRC should be engaging, and was also responsible for speaking 
for CBNRC in government and dealing with problems that arose.64 One former head of DL2, 
John Starnes, claims that this DCS position was a "silly thing."65 Starnes explains that he did 
not have the expertise and technical "know how" for dealing with many CBNRC matters.66 
The DCS position existed from 1954 to 1972 until it was eliminated. 
61
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DL2 also chaired various intelligence committees. As noted above, the head of DL2 
served as the representative from External Affairs on the JIC and was its chair. Years later, 
DL2 continued to have an important relationship with the successor of JIC, the Intelligence 
Advisory Committee (IAC).67 An individual from DL2 ranks would occasionally act as the 
chair of the IAC.68 The IAC was an intelligence management committee, co-ordinated 
intelligence activity within the Canadian community. 
In the area of security, DL2 was responsible for the security of departmental 
personnel and physical property owned by the Department abroad. The security of 
personnel included protecting individuals from being compromised by the Soviets and their 
allies. A secondary duty was maintaining liaison with the RCMP Security Service. There was 
(and remains) an overlap between foreign policy and domestic security issues. The RCMP 
conducted surveillance of Soviet diplomats in Canada who might be conducting espionage 
on Canadian soil, but was not responsible for overall matters of diplomacy or foreign 
relations. The RCMP would advise the Department, but it was External Affairs that would 
advise the government on the nature and timing of any action, such as expelling the 
individual. DEA was broadly concerned about relations with the USSR and also wanted "to 
ensure that a watchful eye was kept on the police" while the RCMP "quite naturally 
assumed that it was more important to catch [Soviet] spies than to curry favour with the 
Soviet government."69 The two organizations occasionally disagreed over declaring 
suspected spies persona non grata (PNG). 
In the late 1980's the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) was divided into two separate organizations: 
the Intelligence Policy Group (IPG) and Intelligence Assessment Committee (IAC). 
68
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An example of a DL2 security and intelligence concerns can be found in a "secret" 
memorandum from 1960. Written by Robert M. Middleton, it was sent to the acting under-
secretary by then head of DL2, John Starnes. The subject was the "Situation in Cuba" and 
the broader context of the memorandum was the seriously deteriorating relationship 
between the United States and Cuba. 
You may be interested in the following extract from Letter No. L-565 of August 23 
[1960] from the Embassy in Havana concerning the departure of dependants [sic ] of 
U.S. Embassy staff members: 
"The completely unofficial evacuation of wives and dependants of U.S. Embassy 
personnel has progressed to a further stage...Last week...the State Department 
(stated in a telegram) that it was assumed that the Embassy would strongly urge 
staff members to send wives and dependants home. The officer in charge of the 
emergency planning at the U.S. Embassy has informed us that he expects, if the 
situation does not improve materially, that within ten days the "urge" will be 
changed to "order". As a result, nearly all wives and children of U.S. Embassy 
personnel have returned, or will be returned to the United States within the next 
week or ten days...". 
For your information we have been making a practice over the past few weeks of 
examining all correspondence from our mission in Havana for similar "Indicators" of 
developments in Cuba.70 
This memorandum is an example of DL2's evaluation work. Based on reports from the 
Canadian embassy in Havana, DL2 was ensuring that senior officials in External Affairs were 
aware that the United States government was in the early stages of evacuating Americans 
from Cuba. Aside from highlighting the importance of this fact, and that Washington may 
have been preparing for an even more serious conflict with Cuba, DL2 was likely also 
implicitly raising the possibility that the Department might consider a similar evacuation of 
Canadians. 
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DL2 existed until 1968,71 when it became the Security and Intelligence Liaison 
Division. No explanation can be found for this restructuring and renaming of DL2. It might 
be related to the integration of the JIB into the Department that same year or to the 
election of a new government in Ottawa and changes in senior officials. The name change 
was significant historically, however, in that it marked the first time External Affairs used 
the word "intelligence" in naming an internal unit. This change also represented the first of 
many name and structural changes to come. 
3.5 Evolution of DEA/DFAIT Intelligence Structures 
The next four decades saw numerous, sometimes rapid, organizational changes in the 
Department with respect to intelligence. These changes have never previously been 
tracked systematically. Research for this thesis however allows, for the first time, at least a 
summary of the organizational shifts. The evolution of the Department's intelligence 
structures is presented in Figure l.72 
70
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Notes: The figure attempts to show both major departmental units and substructures. Solid 
line arrows point to a successor unit. Broken lines and broken line boxes indicate 
autonomous or semi-autonomous units within bureaus. For example, the Security 
Intelligence Liaison Division was the successor unit of DL2 while the Special Research Bureau 
(SRB) was the successor organization of the JIB. The SRB and its successor, the Bureau of 
Economic Intelligence, were autonomous units in the Department until the mid-1980s. 
3.6 Bureau of Intelligence Analysis and Security (BIAS) 
In 1978, the Bureau of Security and Intelligence Liaison was renamed the Bureau of 
Intelligence Analysis and Security (BIAS). The new Bureau was composed of six divisions 
and one unit: the Security Division, Political Intelligence Division, Economic Intelligence 
Division, Interview Division, Intelligence Services Division, and the Co-ordinator for 
Emergency Preparedness. 
The Security Division was responsible for protecting DEA personnel and property 
abroad and managing counter-espionage operations. The McDonald Commission report 
claims that "foreign intelligence agencies have attempted to penetrate the Canadian 
government by compromising its personnel posted abroad, and gaining access to 
communications emanating from Canadian missions."73 The Security Division was to assist 
in detecting such hostile activities and preventing them from occurring. Furthermore, the 
McDonald Commission notes that "the decision to grant or deny a diplomatic visa" (a 
responsibility of External Affairs) will have an important effect on the extent to which 
foreign intelligence officers in the guise of diplomats are admitted to Canada."74 Responding 
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to potential foreign intelligence operations in Canada was a shared responsibility of the 
Department and the RCMP (as noted earlier). 
The Political Intelligence Division (also called the Intelligence and Analysis Division 
for a short period in the 1980s) had the duty of compiling information about various 
geographic areas of the world. Its information came from country and regional desks within 
the Department, from allies and other sources as well.75 Information was collected through 
both overt, gray and covert means and reflected "political, economic, and social trends."76 
IAD reports described the effects of political events abroad on Canada's internal security, 
and were, of course, shared with the Canadian intelligence community and Intelligence 
Advisory Committee. 
The McDonald report provides very little information on the role of the Economic 
Intelligence Division (which was originally a separate bureau called Bureau of Economic 
Intelligence (BEI)) and the Co-ordinator for Emergency Preparedness. The Economic 
Intelligence Division was the successor of SRB and responsible for "collation, storage and 
reporting of economic intelligence."77 The Co-ordinator for Emergency Preparedness was 
responsible for preparing and protecting Canadian missions and its personnel abroad from 
terrorist attacks, and for conducting and co-ordinating the government's response to 
international incidents (including terrorism).78 
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BIAS operated until late 1985. During its time, BIAS dealt with many international 
incidents such as the Iranian student takeover of the American embassy in Tehran in 1979, 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the 1982 Falklands war. 
3.7 Foreign Intelligence Bureau 
In January 1986 the government integrated External Affairs with the trade part of 
the Department of Industry and Trade, forming the Department of External Affairs and 
International Trade. BIAS was reorganized and renamed the Foreign Intelligence Bureau the 
same year. 
The Foreign Intelligence Bureau maintained responsibility for political and economic 
intelligence and still provided intelligence products to policymakers and other departments. 
There were four divisions in the Bureau: the Economic Intelligence Division, Interview 
Division, Political Intelligence Division and Intelligence Services Division.79 
These divisions were actually restructured and/or simply renamed units from BIAS. 
The Economic Intelligence Division was the successor of BEI. It was divided into four 
geographical areas: Europe, Africa and Middle East, Americas and Asia and the Pacific.80 
The Economic Intelligence Division was responsible for analyzing and reporting economic 
intelligence to the relevant departments in government. Richelson does not explain the 
duties of the Political Intelligence Division, but it was also divided into geographical units: 
Africa and Middle East, Asia and Pacific, Europe and Americas.81 The Political Intelligence 
Division most likely collected and assessed information relating to political situations in 
Jeffery Richelson, Foreign Intelligence Organizations, (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988), 81. 
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foreign countries and their effects on Canada. The Intelligence Services Division was 
responsible for the more technical aspects of foreign intelligence work, such as 
"administrative, data management, communications, and liaison functions."82 
The Department's annual report for 1989-1990 mentions that the Foreign 
Intelligence Bureau was involved in evacuating Canadians from China in the aftermath of 
the Tiananmen Square incident.83 The report does not provide specifics about the Bureau's 
operations but it seems reasonable to assume the Bureau helped assist government policy 
during international crisis situations. 
3.8 Foreign Assessment Bureau 
In September 1990, the Foreign Intelligence Bureau was renamed the Foreign 
Assessment Bureau. Continuing the work of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau at the 
Department, the Bureau established the Gulf Assessment Group during the 1990-1991 Gulf 
War and provided "the Department with evaluated intelligence on the crisis and 
subsequent war in the Persian Gulf."84 The Bureau also maintained responsibility for 
representing the Department within the Canadian intelligence community. In fact, the 
Bureau assisted the Intelligence Advisory Committee in drafting many "assessed intelligence 
reports which were discussed interdepartmentally," and later distributed to government 
officials and ministers.85 
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In the mid-1990s, during a period of significant government spending cuts and 
organizational change, the Foreign Assessment Bureau became the Security and Intelligence 
Bureau (ISD). The operations of ISD greatly expanded and included a wide range of 
intelligence and security activities (these functions were discussed in some detail in the 
previous chapter). 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a glimpse into the initial reasons for Canada's decision to 
create the Department of Foreign Affairs, and emphasizes the perceived need for 
intelligence to inform the country's emerging international roles. In ensuing decades, the 
Department's involvement in foreign intelligence work grew. So did its formal structures. 
This chapter has also provided a summary of the evolution of these structures, compiled 
here for the first time. Although it was initially, from the 1920s until 1941, a consumer of 
foreign intelligence, External Affairs did not remain a passive recipient of intelligence 
products from its allies. The Department became actively involved in foreign intelligence 
coordination domestically and in international arrangements for sharing intelligence. Much 
of the Department's work involved liaison with foreign intelligence allies but its contribution 
was not merely in the well-known area of SIGINT collection and in intelligence analysis. The 
following chapters present three illustrative case studies of the Department's human 
intelligence collection operations over the postwar period. 
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Chapter Four: Departmental Structures and Intelligence 
Collection 
Was External Affairs involved in collecting intelligence as well as processing it? This 
chapter presents two case studies illustrating the operations of foreign intelligence 
structures established at the Department. These cases show that, relatively early in its 
history, units within External Affairs were involved in gathering and analyzing intelligence. 
The cases selected are ones where reasonably detailed information is now available in the 
public domain. 
The first case focuses on operations of the Special Intelligence Section (SIS) from 
1942 until 1945 (thus predating DL2). The second case describes the Interview Program 
Section which was established in 1953 and still exists today, having undergone some 
changes over the decades. SIS and the Interview Program Section share two traits, beyond 
the common purpose of intelligence collection and analysis: a niche specialization in their 
duties and a small number of personnel.1 Neither had a broad mandate and both involved a 
relatively small proportion of the Department's time, efforts and finances. These structures 
fulfilled a specific duty that was part of Canada's overall foreign intelligence effort and its 
contribution to allied intelligence. 
4.0 Special Intelligence Section (SIS) 
During World War II, Nazi Germany and its allies employed sophisticated cipher 
machines in their military and diplomatic operations. While there were numerous variants, 
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these cipher machines were collectively referred to as Enigma machines, and employed the 
most powerful encryption and decryption system created at that time. Canada and its allies 
invested a great deal of effort, time, personnel and finances to intercept and decode Axis 
radio communications. Information resulting from the allied decryption operations against 
German communications was called ULTRA. Information obtained from breaking the 
Japanese diplomatic code was called "Magic." Canada also contributed to the allied 
cryptographic effort. 
On June 9,1941 the Canadian cabinet through an executive order established a 
collection and cryptanalysis organization called the Examination Unit (with the acronym 
XU).2 It was Canada's first signals intelligence (SIGINT) "agency" and was placed within the 
National Research Council (NRC), in part to hide it from public scrutiny and enemy 
infiltration. "The original intention in establishing the Examination Unit was to provide 
means by which the activities of [the] Legation maintained in Ottawa by the Vichy 
authorities might be observed."3 Vichy France was a collaborative regime allied to Nazi 
Germany after the defeat of France in 1940. The Vichy diplomats in Ottawa employed 
ciphers in their diplomatic communications. The primary duty of the XU was to intercept 
and decrypt their diplomatic messages. The Free French and Imperial Japan were also 
targets. The Canadian operations included four intercept stations: at Rockclife in Ottawa (to 
1
 To put the staffing of SIS in perspective, DEA had less than a hundred Foreign Service Officers working in 
Ottawa and abroad during the early 1940s. In 1946, the Department administered twenty-six diplomatic 
postings. 
2
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pick up the Vichy signals), and in Amherst, Nova Scotia; Victoria and Riske Creek, British 
Columbia.4 These stations and the cryptographic work of the XU were the Canadian part of 
the broad allied SIGINT efforts, led by the British Government Code and Cipher School and 
American SIGINT agencies, and formalized by the "BRUSA" Agreement of 1943.5 The BRUSA 
arrangements were the forerunners of the postwar UKUSA Agreement of 1947-48. 
External Affairs had a close relationship with the XU. The Department provided 
financial and organizational assistance to establish the Unit and had representatives on the 
"Y" Committee that planned its operations and provided tasking and direction. While the 
XU intercepted and decrypted SIGINT, it did not have the capability to translate and analyze 
the decoded material and provide finished reports to the government and Canada's allies.6 
In September 1942, DEA established the Special Intelligence Section (SIS) as a 
translation and intelligence assessment unit to complement the XU. The Department gave 
the SIS responsibility for "selecting, editing and otherwise interpreting the material which 
was produced in the Examination Unit."7 The Section was physically located at the XU 
offices at 545 Laurier Ave East,8 and staffed by DEA personnel, but these individuals were 
3
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not considered members of the XU.9 The Department "was directly interested not only in 
the administration but the products of the Examination Unit."10 The "Y" Committee agreed 
that SIS was "to have access to all sources of secret information available to the Department 
of External Affairs."11 Since the XU received information from Canada's allies, the SIS had 
access to that information as well. Tommy Stone, who acted as intelligence coordinator for 
External Affairs, saw the work of SIS as a way for Canada to begin to meet its commitment 
to the quid pro quo of intelligence sharing.12 
The head of External Affairs' SIS was a Canadian diplomat named Egerton Herbert 
Norman.13 Norman was born and raised in Japan and studied at Cambridge University, 
receiving a Ph.D. His dissertation was eventually published as a book entitled, Japan's 
Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period.u 
9
 Norman, "Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department of 
External Affairs," 50. 
10
 Norman, "Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department 
of External Affairs," 50. 
11
 Memorandum, "Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on the Examination Unit," Key 
correspondence/photocopies from the Communications Security Establishment, 23 September 1942, DHH, File 
1568-40C, 369. 
12
 Peter St. John, "Canada's Accession to the Allied Intelligence Community," Conflict Quarterly 4, no. 4 (1984): 
13. 
E. Herbert Norman became a tragic victim of Cold War politics and American national security. He was 
branded a Communist spy numerous times by certain American officials in the 1950s, and committed suicide 
in April 1957. On the life of Norman, see Charles Taylor, Six Journeys: A Canadian Pattern (Toronto: Anansi, 
1977) or Roger Bowen, Innocence is not Enough: The life and Death of Herbert Norman (Vancouver: Douglas & 
Mclnytre Ltd., 1986). For the prosecution case against Norman, see James Barros, No Sense of Evil: Espionage, 
the Case of Herbert Norman (Toronto: Deneau, 1986). In 1990, the Canadian government asked an academic 
to conduct an investigation on the case of Norman, and report on charges Norman was a communist spy. His 
conclusion was that Norman did have Communist sympathies but he was never a spy, see Peyton V. Lyon, 
"The Loyalties of E. Herbert Norman," Labour/Le Travail 28 (Fall 1991). The Canadian government, however, 
did not give Lyon access to certain key documents, including Norman's personnel file (Peyton V. Lyon, 
personal communication to Don Munton, 1991). Interestingly, James Littleton, author of Target Nation: 
Canada and the Western Intelligence Network, described Norman's relationship with the Americans as "a 
bitter irony" since the American intelligence community agencies were consumers of his intelligence work. 
14
 E. Herbert Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and economic problems of the Meiji 
period (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940). The book is now recognized as a classic in its field. A 
former colleague of Norman's describes the book "as a fundamental, sociological, economic and historical 
83 
Norman joined External Affairs and served in Japan from 1940 to 1942 as a language officer 
and third secretary at the Canadian legation in Tokyo. After Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, 
allied diplomats were placed under house arrest for seven months, including Canadian 
diplomats. Norman spent most of his time in the legation library studying Japanese. 
In September 1942, Norman returned to Ottawa and to External Affairs and was 
enlisted into the ranks of SIS. Individuals with command of the Japanese language were 
invaluable to the intelligence communities in Canada and allied countries. British Security 
Coordination (BSC), a cover organization for the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) 
based in New York City, asked DEA to send them Norman.15 Stone objected to the transfer 
of Norman during the war because he was needed in Canada.16 
As head of SIS, Norman was selected as chairman of the "Y" sub-committee for 
assignments. The "Sub-Committee reviewed the interception analysis of Canadian 
monitoring stations in co-ordination with United States and United Kingdom requests, 
readjusting the assignments of circuits for monitoring stations to meet fresh 
requirements."17 
Alongside Norman in SIS was Arthur R. Menzies. Menzies was born in China and 
educated in Japan. He spoke various Chinese dialects, as well as French, and had travelled 
widely in the Asia-Pacific region. At the time Menzies was in the Section, from November 
analysis of the change over of the Tokugawa military government to the Meiji Restoration" (Arthur Menzies, 
interview with author, December 8, 2003, Ottawa, Ontario. 
The head of BSC was William Stephenson, a Canadian. For a somewhat embellished account of Stephenson's 
work, see William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid (New York: Ballantine, 1976). BSC had both intelligence 
and propaganda tasks. 
16
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1942 until February 1944, he was the only person in DEA who specialized in China.18 
Eventually, G.W. Hilborn would replace him in February 1944; Hilbom's foreign language 
specialty however was Spanish. The stenographic, research and clerical staff consisted of 
three people, Miss G. Parsons, Miss F. Roxborough and Miss R. Bogue. 
The overall role of SIS personnel was to ensure material intercepted and decrypted 
byXU was properly translated, collated, analyzed, categorized and transformed into 
intelligence products. Norman argues the importance of "the task of filing each message, 
Japanese and French, building up a system of cross references, and making cards on each 
proper name and subject was essential to the work of this section."20 
The work of the SIS was divided among the personnel "based on their expertise." 
Norman conducted analytical work on Japan and Menzies focused on French traffic. In an 
interview with Menzies, he jokingly suggested, "Norman did Japan and I did everything else, 
including the laundry."21 Some of the traffic translated and analyzed by SIS from the Asia-
Pacific region consisted of traffic between the Vichy government and its diplomatic 
missions.22 Vichy France maintained administration of France's largest colony in Asia, 
French Indochina (now, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) and also maintained diplomatic 
missions in Japan and Occupied China (Chinese territory invaded and captured by Japan in 
1937). In September 1940, Japan used its alliance with the Vichy government to establish 
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strategic military bases in French Indochina. Collecting intelligence on the Indochina region 
thus helped to understand how the Japanese were operating and what the Vichy French 
were thinking and doing.23 
The XU was also intercepting and decrypting high and low grade traffic between 
Japanese missions in Europe, South America and Tokyo. The European centres targeted 
were, "Berlin, Moscow, Stockholm, Lisbon, Salo (Italian Fascist puppet regime), Zagreb, 
Berne and Vatican City."24 The South American centres were Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Peru. These intercepts were provided to SIS for translation and analysis. 
The limited resources at SIS had an affect on the production of intelligence reports. 
When Norman was planning to attend an intelligence meeting in Washington, DC on 
October 31,1942, Stone notes, "Norman's absence from Ottawa means approximately a 
fifty percent closing down of activities of his little organization."25 The other fifty percent 
was Menzies. 
During the 1940s there was little academic research or literature in Canada on Asian 
countries.26 Norman's and Menzies' background knowledge about Asia meant part of their 
job was to provide a general understanding to government officials about Asian society, 
culture, religion, politics, norms and values. For instances, Menzies states that there were 
"distorted views of Japanese [people] both in the US and Britain because of the Kamikaze 
22
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approach to warfare. Some people in the allied side considered the Japanese were not 
human. Part of the job was to understand the background of the Japanese and traditions of 
the Samurai."27 
SIS reported on a number of different subject matters from around the world. The 
focus, according to Norman, was primarily diplomatic material with small amounts of 
economic and military information.28 Norman did not explain what constituted diplomatic 
material, but one can assume he was discussing political agendas, issues, plans and 
statements from Axis governments about the war and their allies. In some instances 
Japanese diplomatic traffic from South America mentioned the names and activities of pro-
Axis politicians in Chile and Argentina, or discussed the internal wrangling in the countries.29 
In other instances, Vichy diplomatic traffic from Japan provided information about internal 
discord. As one External Affairs official said: 
Messages from this source [Vichy diplomatic missions] contained occasional 
comment of considerable importance on the attitude of the Japanese Government 
and as the collapse of Germany approached, the Vichy representative in Tokyo 
provided evidence from inside Japan of the growing concern of Japanese leaders 
over the worsening situation, of divisions amongst Japanese military and political 
leaders and of the effects of air-raids.30 
Memorandum, "Teletype Message," Key correspondence/photocopies from the Communications Security 
Establishment, October 24,1942, DHH, File 1568-40C, 385. 
Menzies, interview. 
27
 Menzies, interview. 
Norman, "Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department 
of External Affairs," 52. 
Norman, "Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department 
of External Affairs," 52. 
30
 Riddel!, "French Intelligence," 61-62. 
87 
The intelligence product of SIS was distributed and disseminated to External Affairs and the 
directors of air, military and naval Intelligence as well as to allies.31 It is reasonable to infer 
that SIS translation and analysis capabilities provided important information about the war. 
An example of SIS analytical work is found in a secret memorandum dated October 
16,1943 written by Norman. The analysis is based on information provided by the 
American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to Norman. The focus of the memorandum is 
the strategic significance of Sumatra (an island of Indonesia) to Japanese operations in the 
South Pacific. 
In 1940 Imperial Japan had expanded its empire in South East Asia but was 
dependent on the seas for logistical support and thus had to dominate the South-Asian 
seas. The United States had opposed Japanese expansionism, and gradually imposed trade 
embargos and sanctions. Pre-war Japan had been heavily dependent on key American 
supplies, such as oil, but the US terminated all oil exports in the summer of 1941 after Japan 
expanded into French Indochina. The island of Sumatra became a key source of natural 
resources for Japan, including oil and bauxite, used in the production of aluminium which 
was critical to aircraft manufacturing. Herbert Norman's memorandum noted that: 
[Sumatra] is the most strategically placed of all the Netherlands East Indies. It is a 
base which threatens Singapore and commands the Straits of Malacca; it is 
considered by the Dutch as an ideal place on which to land agents. It is the richest oil 
producing part of the Indies since at least half of the oil of the Indies comes from this 
inland, particularly from the refineries at Pangkalan, Berandan and also in 
Palembang. It is believed that the 1942 production of the island was 30,000,000 
barrels, representing quite an increase. It would cover at least half of Japan's annual 
requirements. The Japanese look to Sumatra and Bintan islands for 80% of their 
bauxite ores. If deprived of these resources the Japanese would have to draw on 
Memorandum, "Untitled," Special Intelligence Section and intelligence sharing, sections marked "Most 
Secret," June 22,1943, Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC], RG 24, Vol. 29163, File WWII-5, Part 2. 
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their stockpiles which are of poor grade and at latest estimates, would not last very 
long - not more than a year. 
Bangka and Billiton, small islands off the coast of Sumatra, produce four times the 
amount of tin which Japan needs. Sumatra is also valuable for the supply of 
rubber.32 
Norman's assessment of the island made clear it would be a prime target. Sumatra 
also acted as a Japanese central logistics hub in South-East Asia. Its reconquest "would 
represent a very heavy blow to Japan, probably more than any one island in the whole 
archipelago."33 
A July 1944 Magic Diplomatic Summary noted that "any Allied action that cuts off, or 
materially reduces, Japan's bauxite imports will have an immediate effect on her aluminium 
production. In turn this will lower her aircraft production within six months."34 Action 
against Sumatra would thus significantly disrupt Japan's war machine. 
Norman's memorandum supported the allied military strategy in the South-Pacific at 
the time. In late 1942, American General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. 
Nimitz, commenced the "island hopping" strategy. This strategy involved "bypass[ing] 
heavily fortified Japanese positions and instead concentratepng] the limited allied resources 
on strategically important islands that were not well defended but capable of supporting 
the drive to the main islands of Japan."35 The allies blockaded and isolated Japanese 
military forces, ensuring Japan could not resupply and reinforce positions. On January 24 
and 29, 1945 the British mounted Operations Meridian One and Meridian Two on the oil 
32
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refineries on Palembang, Sumatra.36 These attacks were successful; "critical aviation fuel 
output of these plants [was] reduced by seventy-five percent."37 Norman's assessment of 
Sumatra's oil production was proved correct. 
Gilbert de B. Robinson, a mathematician and codebreaker at the XU, states that the 
intelligence community "came to depend on Norman's summaries."38 Robinson also notes 
that SIS work based on "reports of Japanese diplomats from Europe and South America 
were of the greatest value in forming a picture of the progress of the war."39 
In the United States, OSS was an "avid consumer."40 At the same time, access to SIS 
product was restricted; OSS officials were "permitted only to read them in [Lester B.] 
Pearson's [embassy] office in Washington."41 In return, OSS would share "certain weekly 
bulletins and other confidential research data, particularly on the Far East."42 In the case of 
G2 (US military intelligence), SIS operated an informal sharing agreement that was designed 
to exchange intelligence to make "comparisons of method, particularly interpretation of 
material, etc."43 
Canada shared SIS intelligence with Britain and it was sent via BSC. Arrangements 
were made between BSC and XU to establish a telekrypton (T/K) link, a secure radio 
communication system. The partners decided that "high grade material of current 
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intelligence value," was to be sent by T/K, "while low grade material [would] come by 
bag."44 Sorting and organizing of the data would be completed by BSC. 
In January 1945, as the war was coming to its conclusion, DEA closed SIS. Norman 
Robertson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, acknowledges, "this small unit 
has fulfilled a very useful purpose, but in view of the fact that its work was no longer as 
essential as it had been and in view of the shortage of staff in this Department, I came to 
the conclusion that it would be wisest to draw it to an end."45 Norman and Hilborn 
returned to regular duties in the Department, however both continued reading and 
summarizing Japanese and Vichy French diplomatic traffic for External Affairs. The wartime 
creation of SIS marked the beginning of a greater intelligence role for the Department and 
of its work with SIGINT. 
4.1 Interview Program Section 
Continually since 1953, the Canadian government has operated a foreign 
intelligence program designed to collect HUMINT through debriefing of Canadians and 
others who go abroad. The Interview Program Section (ISIW) was once located in DND and, 
was transferred to External Affairs about thirty years ago. It still resides in what is now the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. There are very few references to 
the Program and its predecessors in academic, government or other publications.46 The 
M. R. Oliver, "Unit Establishment," in A History of the Examination Unit, 1941-1945, ed. Gilbert de B. 
Robinson, (1945), 76. 
45
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Committee (SIRC) (December 1988). The RCMP operated an interview program in the past, but it is not clear if 
only article on the Interview Program is by a FSO, Kurt F. Jensen. Jensen provides some 
understanding of why it is difficult to research the Interview Program. He indicated that it is 
"the method of collection [that] is sensitive, not the information itself, and the source needs 
protecting."48 Both the methods employed by the Department and information obtained 
are classified.49 
The Interview Program Section does not employ covert tactics to collect intelligence. 
It basically asks ordinary Canadians and others (others can be defectors, asylum seekers, 
immigrants or refugees, etc) to provide observations from their foreign travels, generally of 
a political, military, social, and scientific nature. The information collected from the 
interviewees is HUMINT and a form of gray intelligence collection - it "is neither entirely 
Open Source nor Clandestine in origin."50 
The first discussion of debriefing ordinary people came at a JIC meeting in May 
1948.51 At the meeting, it was proposed that the JIB might collect open source intelligence 
from "commercial firms, learned societies, libraries, and travellers."52 On June 1,1948, the 
JIB was authorized by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to do "some limited interviewing" of 
it exists today. See preface in Jack L. Granatstein and David Stafford, Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada from 
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foreign travellers.53 JIB only debriefed immigrants, defectors, and some Canadian citizens 
for socio-political and economic information on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.54 
In March 1951, again at a JIC meeting, member organizations discussed the creation 
of a permanent fulltime structure for debriefing but no actions were instigated. In August 
1951 an allied intelligence agency approached George Glazebrook, the chairman of JIC and 
head of DL2, for information collected from "immigrants, defectors and others in Canada."55 
Shortly after, Canada created a permanent debriefing program. 
The organizing of such a program began in March 1952. Allied countries encouraged 
the Canadian government "to proceed with establishing an interview organization to 
facilitate a greater exchange of intelligence, highlighting the considerable intelligence value 
which existed from such relatively overt intelligence gathering."56 Allied countries had been 
debriefing foreign travellers and defectors since World War II. For instance, the CIA had a 
similar structure. In June 1952, General Charles Foulkes, Chairman of Canada's Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, met with the American Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Walter 
Beddell Smith, to inform him that Canada was in the process of establishing a permanent 
debriefing organization. Details of the liaison arrangements with the United States, for this 
unit, were to be worked out.57 
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The JIC presented a proposal for establishing what was described as an 
"Interrogation Organization."58 Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, opposed the use of the 
term "interrogation" for the new unit.59 The word "interrogation" implied the use of 
coercive tactics to force individuals into providing information. The name was quickly 
changed to "Interview Organization." In April 1953, an order-in-council established the new 
unit and placed it in the JIB.60 
The JIB however did not control planning and direction for the Interview Program. 
The policy direction and guidance initially came from the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In 1960 
the policy direction responsibility would shift to the Privy Council Office's Intelligence Policy 
Committee.61 This change had a significant affect on the Interview Program's mandate. The 
original mandate dictated that it would focus on defectors and immigrants from Communist 
countries, and those who had "backgrounds of particular interest and had left their country 
of origin less than three years earlier."62 After 1960, the mandate included interviewing 
Canadians in general who had travelled to Communist countries. 
The Interview Program identified Canadian citizens who were going abroad through 
a unique situation. Canadian citizens often approached government departments (including 
External Affairs) for travel information. This was a time when the West knew very little 
about the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. In 1961, the government 
authorized briefings of Canadians who were going to travel abroad.63 Canadian travellers 
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often requested information about commercial, industrial, scientific, historical, cultural and 
political matters.64 Occasionally, the RCMP would also provide information in order to help 
protect people from being compromised by Soviet intelligence and its allies.65 
How did the Interview Program recruit people? Individuals were not coerced, 
induced with money or promised assistance in the future.66 They volunteered, after being 
approached or they themselves approached the Interview Program to share their 
information. At first, the Interview Program usually approached individuals, by letter, after 
the people had travelled abroad, asking whether they would meet with one of its members. 
The letter indicated the information the traveller provided would be "used only in the 
interests of national security."67 Jensen indicates that "for various reasons this was not a 
good way to make contact and the letters were discontinued."68 In other instances, emigre 
groups "spontaneously contacted] the Interview Program to offer their assistance."69 
Many of these people did not support the policies of their former countries. 
What types of people were interviewed? Initially, the unit chose only to interview 
engineers, technicians, business people, academics and scientists. Later it realized that 
anyone travelling abroad might have useful information for the government. Would be 
recruits were generally agreeable to provide information; "there were relatively few 
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instances of refusals to assist."70 Interestingly, people were often pleased that the 
government regarded their observation as of high importance. 
The Interview Program would select 150 to 200 people annually who were deemed 
qualified as observers, and had experience in a subject matter or had visited a specific 
country, particularly Communist countries such as the Soviet Union, Cuba, or China.71 These 
countries were closed societies and the Canadian government had very little knowledge 
about the internal workings of these countries. General cultural, economic, political and 
societal information that is available in the West was difficult to find in these countries. 
Interviewees were selected on the basis of the type of information they could provide to 
the Program.72 Moreover, the interviewers would take into account such aspects as 
education, employment and military service.73 
Were the same people interviewed more than once? It seems the Interview 
Program did not conform to a single formula. In most instances people were only debriefed 
once because they had no other opportunity (i.e. only travelled once) to gain access to 
additional information of interest. Some people were debriefed on more than a single 
occasion, if they had consistent access to information (for example, regularly visiting a 
specific country of interest to Canadian government) or gained access to some other 
information of interest. 
For short period in 1958 the Interview Program also made contact with potential 
interviewees before they travelled. The Program staff advised the prospective travellers to 
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respect the customs and laws of the country but asked them to pay attention to particular 
areas or matters of interest to the government. They were not asked to use intelligence 
collection devices or to take photographs, make sketches, or take notes that were not 
related to their visit. Such actions could have aroused suspicion and jeopardised the 
individual's visit or work in the country at that time or in the future.74 Nevertheless, the 
Interview Program needed to inform senior External Affairs officials and receive approval 
before any contact was made with an individual.75 Jensen states that use of these pre-visit 
briefings was short-lived because "the danger of sending untrained observers into hostile 
areas with specific intelligence collection requirements is self-evident."76 
The Interview Program was relatively prolific, although the quantity of reports it 
produced varied based on the time period and the subject matter in question. Jensen notes 
one estimate that between 1953 and 1965, 455 reports were produced about the Soviet 
Union and China.77 Other documentation suggests that the Program produced over 500 
reports in general during 1960-1965.78 For example, one interviewee who specialized in 
electro-chemistry provided information that led to no less than eleven reports totalling 215 
pages.79 People with such specialized areas of expertise presumably were of significant 
importance to government officials and intelligence agencies. 
The Interview Program underwent structural changes in the latter 1960s. Until 
1966, the JIB had been located in DND. The Pearson government decided to amalgamate 
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various DND divisions as a part of the unification of the Canadian Forces (CF). The 
integration of the army, navy and air force into one combined force also affected the three 
service intelligence divisions, JIB and other intelligence organizations. The newly formed 
DND intelligence organization was headed by a Director General, Intelligence (DGI). JIB 
personnel resented the restructuring because they had a broad intelligence mandate which 
extended beyond DND. 
On April 1,1968 the JIB was moved to External Affairs, as was the Interview 
Program.80 Once there, the JIB was renamed the Special Research Bureau (SRB) and 
operated as a "separate entity" of the Security and Intelligence Liaison Division.81 The 
Interview Program was renamed at this time, becoming the "Domestic Contact Section," 
and was attached to the SRB. Of the fifty-six personnel at SRB, five officers "constituted the 
Domestic Contact Section."82 In 1979, the Interview Program became a part of the 
Intelligence Analysis Division (IAD) and the rest of the Bureau was integrated into the 
intelligence division.83 These changes occurred as part of a restructuring of security and 
intelligence duties for the External Affairs. As Jensen claims, External Affairs wanted to end 
SRB's "autonomous status" within the Department and to be able to influence the Interview 
Program.84 Nevertheless, the most radical change for the Interview Program came in 1985, 
when the Department reorganized the intelligence structures again and formed the Foreign 
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Intelligence Bureau. Under this new Bureau the Interview Program became a separate 
directorate, for the first time not connected to any other unit.85 
After the Program was moved to DEA, its operations did not undergo any radical 
changes, at least until the 1980s. The staff level remained the same, about five to six 
interview officers. The Interview Program still targeted Communist countries and later 
other countries viewed as closed societies were added.86 Significant changes to the 
Interview Program's mandate did come until the collapse of the Soviet Union and its 
satellite states after 1989. 
Since its creation in 1953, the Interview Program has weathered political storms, 
departmental budget cuts and repeated restructurings. It has also adapted to radical 
changes in the international system such as the end of the Cold War. Jensen acknowledges 
that "the Interview Program...had to reinvent itself" to assure its survival for the future.87 
Its ability to collect useful specialized gray HUMINTforthe Department, intelligence 
community and allies presumably helped protect it from more fundamental restructuring 
and disbanding. 
No operational case studies of the Interview Program in action can be found in the 
public domain. A CIA debriefing program called Operation Redskin can however be used as 
an example of how the Interview Program may have operated and employed ordinary 
citizens to collect Humint. In 1953, the British and Canadian air attaches were the first 
Westerners to see and report the development of new the Soviet Tupolev TU-4 long-range 
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bomber.88 The US and its allies continued a coordinated effort to observe strategic Soviet 
military locations and equipment. David Owen, author of Hidden Secrets, states that CIA 
used these sightings and others to implement Operation Redskin, a debriefing operation.89 
This operation provided "nondiplomatic visitors from the West with a list of things to watch 
for on the other side of the Iron Curtain."90 These individuals did not need to change their 
travel itineraries or make contact with particular people, but were asked to make notes on 
"the color of the smoke from a particular factory chimney, or the registration letters of the 
airplane on which they flew."91 As the Soviet Union began easing travel restrictions on 
visitors, the CIA expanded these operations.92 Owen claims that Operation Redskin was a 
successful program; for example, it produced detailed reports about surface-to-air missile 
sites, intercontinental ballistic missile sites and military production factories.93 The 
Interview Program was likely modelled on the success of Operation Redskin or similar 
operations, given that it employed similar methods. 
Little is known about the technical aspects of the Interview Program, especially the 
operational methods used to extract information from interviewees and the necessary skills 
of interviewers. Some relevant information can be gleaned from a declassified Studies of 
Intelligence document on debriefing, and another document on interrogation methods.94 
The former, a CIA paper, discusses a joint debriefing of a Cuban defector. An article on 
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interrogation describes the uses and failures of torture and lists the necessary skills of an 
interrogator. Some of this information can be applied to understand the operations of the 
Interview Program. 
B. E. Layton states that interview sessions follow particular patterns before, during 
and after the meeting. Prior to beginning any debriefing a background check is essential to 
ensure that the session will deal with the interviewee's knowledge.95 Next the interviewer 
develops a set of questions that follows a logical pattern to the end of the session, and 
"[beginning] with more technical subjects and [concluding] with more general [ones]."96 
Organizing the session in this way allows the interviewee to answer questions first relating 
to a topic with which he or she is most familiar. These may then enhance greater co-
operation and allow questions in other areas.97 After the interview session the raw 
information is analyzed and disseminated. 
Debriefing of defectors, the CIA notes, should occur as soon as possible; a prolonged 
wait likely reduces the value of the information gained.98 "A person who has some special 
knowledge gained from travel, from residence in a foreign country, or perhaps from an 
interest in some esoteric branch of the arts or science" may be able to identify what might 
B. E. Layton, "The Joint Debriefing of a Cuban," Studies in Intelligence 7 (Summer 1963): 57-61; and William 
R. Johnson, "Tricks of the Trade: Counterintelligence Interrogation," International Journal of Intelligence and 
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otherwise be unidentified in, for example, aerial photography." Interviews can thus 
complement and assist other types of intelligence collection. 
The necessary skills of an interview officer are somewhat equivalent to an 
interrogator, minus the ability to use force to collect information. William R. Johnson lists 
four skills that make good interrogators: experience in analysis of file material, a working 
knowledge of psychology, understanding of themselves and their own emotions, and 
patience.100 All of these skills most likely apply to an interview officer. Johnson states that 
an "interrogator, like a priest or doctor, must have a talent for empathy, a personal need to 
communicate with other people, a concern for what makes other people tick."101 Knowing 
how to deal with people's emotions creates a bond of trust and allows the interview officer 
to obtain information more easily. 
4.2 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Interview Program's proven ability to collect foreign HUMINT over 
half a century has contributed to Canadian foreign intelligence collection and analysis. It 
has done so for a relatively small cost since the Program has remained relatively small in 
size. Development of the Interview Program, and likely its operations, reflect Canada's 
involvement in international intelligence cooperation and liaison arrangements. 
These two case studies show that the Department of External Affairs has long been 
actively involved in foreign intelligence work. In the case of SIS, the Department provided 
personnel and direction in the operation of the unit. The Interview Program was initially 
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established outside of External Affairs but later incorporated and operated as one of its 
units. Both structures were created with the Department's support and, to some extent, 
under operational control or influence. 
Both the SIS and Interview Program were also intelligence structures established to 
support not only Canada's but also its allies' intelligence needs. While the Examination Unit 
was originally created during World War II, it survived the end of the war. As noted in 
Chapter 2, its successor, the Communications Branch of the National Research Council 
(which in turn became the Communications Security Establishment or CSE), was a key 
player in the so-called "UKUSA" agreement and thus part of the Western intelligence effort 
aiming its attention at the Soviet Union. That cooperative Cold War effort yielded one of its 
most significant successes in the "Venona" operation.102 At least one analyst has observed 
that "Canadian traffic analysts are believed to have made a valuable contribution to the 
overall operation."103 The following chapter will describe some of the Department's 
intelligence operations abroad. 
On Venona, see Norman Polmar and Thomas B Allen, Spy Book: The Encyclopaedia of Espionage (New York: 
Random, 1998), 575-8. 
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You can call it spying if you want, but it's not, it's not, it's not. 
-James Eayrs1 
Chapter Five: Collecting Intelligence Abroad 
In many conventional views of international affairs, foreign intelligence operations 
and international diplomatic processes seem to represent different worlds. As noted in 
Chapter One, however, the reality is that most if not all countries conduct not only covert, 
but also gray foreign intelligence operations through their embassies. Espionage and 
diplomacy are not the polar opposites they are often assumed to be. Indeed, some of the 
basic tasks involved are not at all dissimilar. Countries send intelligence officers from 
foreign intelligence agencies abroad to gather intelligence, and provide them with "official 
cover" in diplomatic positions. Foreign ministry personnel also gather information abroad, 
and do so using many but not all of the same techniques used by intelligence officers. The 
Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP) mentioned in Chapter 2 is an example of present 
day diplomatic foreign intelligence gathering program. 
Canada's Department of External Affairs and its current successor, the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, are no exception. They have used Canadian 
posts abroad to collect foreign intelligence, often to be shared with Canada's allies. Given 
Canada's lack of an intelligence agency specializing in HUMINT, much intelligence collection 
was done by diplomats, most of it limited to non-clandestine/gray intelligence operations. 
(Military attaches are also posted to many Canadian missions abroad (as noted in Chapter 
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Two) but the focus here is on the activities of the diplomats.) In short, the Department's 
intelligence collection work was not confined to activities carried out at home, such as 
those of Herbert Norman's SIS and the Interview Program. 
It is not possible to survey the Department's foreign intelligence activity or to show 
its full extent. The documentary evidence is simply not available to do so and the secrecy of 
these operations probably ensures there is little confirming evidence. This chapter thus 
aims to provide examples of Canadian operations abroad in order to suggest what was 
done. It will provide two studies as examples of External Affairs' approach to and methods 
of foreign intelligence collection in the field. These two case studies illustrate Canadian 
willingness to cooperate in the collection and sharing of foreign intelligence with its allies. 
The first focuses on operations conducted in the former French Indochina (Cambodia, Laos 
and Vietnam) while Canada was a member of the International Commissions for Supervision 
and Control (ICSC) following the Geneva Accords of 1954. The other case study examines 
intelligence operations conducted out of the Canadian embassy in Cuba in the 1960s.2 
5.0 Canada and the International Commissions for Supervision and Control 
In the aftermath of World War II France attempted to reassert itself as a colonial 
power in the world and specifically in French Indochina. However, France was unable to 
win its colonial war and on July 20, 1954, signed the Geneva Accords, ending the so-called 
First Indochina War. The Accords created three International Commissions for Supervision 
1
 James Eayrs, telephone interview by author, July 25, 2003. 
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and Control (ICSC), one each for what are now called Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, to 
supervise the peace and ensure the signatories were complying with the stipulations.3 The 
Commissions were not expected to enforce the cease-fire or provide military forces to 
impose peace. 
Three members of the ICSC were designated: India, Poland and Canada.4 India was 
made the chair because of its non-aligned status in international affairs, while Poland and 
Canada were chosen to represent the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance, respectively. 
None of Canada's allies officially proposed its nomination; the Chinese foreign minister, 
Chou En-lai, nominated Canada, instead of the alternative, Belgium, to the Commissions, 
and his suggestion was accepted5 
The ICSC were not under the control of or subordinate to the UN. At the time, the 
Canadian government believed, or claimed, "participation will be fully in harmony with our 
responsibilities as a member of the world organization."6 The role of ICSC, Ottawa noted, 
was to act in a "solely supervisory, judicial, and mediatory" capacity as a go between for the 
parties involved.7 
Robert A. Mackay, acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, sent a letter 
of instruction to the Canadian representatives traveling to the initial ICSC meetings on July 
28,1954. The letter not only provides details about inspection teams, language, finance 
Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) Conference, Ottawa, Ontario, September 29, 
2002) (soon to be an article). Both of these sources utilized primary documents. 
3
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and other matters but also explains the role of the Canadian delegation. Mackay 
emphasized what the Department referred to as "judicial impartiality." 
While it will no doubt be assumed - and correctly - that Canada's representatives on 
the three Commissions will reflect a Western outlook in their approach to the 
problems which the Commissions will have to solve, it is important that they should 
at all times do their utmost to maintain an attitude of judicial impartiality in the 
performance of their duties. In particular, it would seem to be imperative that we 
should impress upon the Indians our attitude of objectivity and fairness so that, 
when the Commissions have important decisions to take, we could hope that they 
would give our views serious and favourable consideration, particularly when 
majority reports will have to be submitted to the Geneva powers. 
While we do expect to keep our friends and allies, when appropriate, informed of 
the work of the Commissions, we do not intend thereby to let them direct our 
decisions. Moreover, in accepting to participate, we have not taken it upon 
ourselves to favour any cause or interest, other than seeing to it that the Geneva 
Agreements are properly executed. In the circumstances, every reasonable effort 
should be made to avoid giving the impression of partiality in the performance of 
your duties.8 
The stance of "judicial impartiality," however much it was assumed in the early years 
of the ICSC work, would become harder and harder to maintain by the latter 1950s. The 
Canadian government at first had been very reluctant to join ICSC. The New York Times 
headline, reported on its front page, was "Canada Cautious on Indochina."9 The 
government was concerned with whether ICSC was going to fail from the outset and if 
unanimity was needed for all decisions.10 The Canadian government made a valid argument 
that acceptance of ICSC membership would create a strain on the limited personnel 
available from both DEA and DND, taking into consideration the fact that Canada had 
7
 "Indochina - Membership on International Commission" 
8
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existing military commitments in Korea and Western Europe. At the same time, the 
government was greatly worried how the United States would react to Canada's possible 
ICSC membership.11 
Prior to Canada's acceptance of membership on July 27,1954, the Canadian 
Ambassador to the United States, A. D. P. Heeney, went to the State Department to inform 
the Americans that the Canadian ICSC delegation would provide intelligence collected in the 
field.12 The Canadian government's actions were, as Eayrs states, an attempt "to induce the 
US administration to become more supportive than it then seemed to be of Canada's 
acceptance."13 Pearson told Heeney to emphasize that any intelligence provided to the 
Americans should not be discussed in the public; otherwise Canada "would have to 
reconsider the whole policy of passing on information to the United States."14 
Canadian officials thus collected and shared intelligence with the United States and 
other allies from the outset of its involvement with the ICSC. What is not clear from the 
available documents is when Canada's intelligence and liaison operations ended. The ICSC 
continued to exist through the 1960s, although it was greatly hampered by the ongoing 
American stage of the war and had become virtually ineffectual. The Commission 
eventually ceased to operate in 1972. There is no doubt, therefore, that Canada had ended 
its intelligence operations from within the ICSC by that point if not earlier. 
The United States became involved in Indochina in September 1950 when it sent a 
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to advise French forces struggling against the 
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communist supported "Viet Minn." At the time, the basic American approach to dealing 
with the perceived threat of communism was its foreign policy strategy of 'Containment' --
preventing the spread of communism to other countries through political and military 
support. After the defeat of French forces in 1954, the US began to support South Vietnam 
against the North, beginning what became known in the United States as "the Vietnam 
War." Eventually, as is well known, US involvement evolved from military training to full 
combat operations. A prime rationale was the so-called "domino theory" which held that, 
should South Vietnam be taken over by communist North Vietnam, then all of the countries 
of Southeast Asia would, in turn, like dominoes, fall to communism. The evident American 
concern about developments, especially in Vietnam, during the 1950s, made Washington 
interested in whatever intelligence Canada could provide from its vantage point on the 
Commissions. 
What types of intelligence collection did Canada employ in Indochina? The Canadian 
ICSC delegation largely collected HUMINT during their inspection work, and much of it of 
the "gray intelligence" variety. The representatives used similar methods to those used by 
other diplomats and attaches, such as observing military positions and operations and 
interviewing people in the field. Although Canadian SIGINT operations during World War II 
had focused in part on Indochina, as it was then a French colony under the control of the 
Vichy government (see Chapter Three), there is no information suggesting the 
Communications Branch of the National Research Council (CBNRC) conducted any post-
Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 242-243. 
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World War II operations in Indochina. There is also no evidence in the public domain of any 
"embassy collection" operations there. 
Both DEA and DND provided personnel for the Canadian ICSC delegations. The first 
Canadian commissioner was Brigadier Sherwood Lett. The Canadian Commissioner in the 
mid-1960s was James Blair Seaborn, a senior foreign service officer.15 While many External 
Affairs personnel served on the Canadian delegation, the inspection teams consisted mostly 
of military officers because the technical nature of much of the work required that 
expertise. In the early years of the ICSC, Commission personnel travelled throughout 
Indochina to observe the actions of the signatories to the Geneva Accords and assess 
compliance.16 
As indicated in Chapter Two, military attaches usually collect intelligence on behalf 
of governments. The Canadian military personnel in Indochina, however, were not formally 
attaches as they were part of the Canadian delegation to the international commissions. 
5.1 Sharing Indochina Intelligence 
Robert MacKay's letter of instruction to the Canadian ICSC delegation also contained 
a section entitled "Reporting," which explained that the Canadian ICSC delegation was to 
collect and provide "intelligence" to Canada's allies: 
In sending reports on the New Delhi meetings, and subsequently from Saigon, you 
should bear in mind our obligation and desire to keep the United Kingdom, Australia, 
New Zealand, the United States and France informed. To simplify our task in this 
15
 Indeed, some estimates are that one-third of Canada's foreign service officers ultimately participated in the 
ICSC. 
16
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regard, it might be helpful if you were to send reports in a form which could be 
shown to these Governments. Please inform us what information has been given to 
the local representatives of these Governments. Any further comment which you 
might wish to add of a more restricted nature might be sent in a supplementary 
telegram marked "for Canadian eyes only". We are studying the possibility of setting 
up a separate series of communications along the lines of CRO Circular telegrams 
which would facilitate the transmission of information on the Indochina operation to 
our friends, and will notify you of any procedural changes in communications which 
might be required in this connection.17 
This section of the letter makes clear the Department explicitly authorized providing 
intelligence. It identifies the consumers of Canada's intelligence, and confirms that it would 
be provided to these countries either directly from the delegation or from DEA 
headquarters. The countries mentioned (except France) are, of course, the members of the 
UKUSA intelligence agreement (see Chapter Three). 
Blair Seaborn has confirmed some information found in this letter. "Some of [the 
intelligence] was passed through Ottawa...[and] there was a lot of sharing, largely because 
of the fact that through the Commission we had to make regular trips to North Vietnam. 
Therefore, [we] had physical access to see what was happening in that country, which the 
Americans did not have, unless they had agents up there."18 
There is very little mention in official documents of intelligence-sharing with allies 
other than the United States. Eayrs' cites one External Affairs memorandum marked, 
"Passed to UK-US-Australian agencies by JIB" - a rare case of unambiguous evidence of 
intelligence-sharing.19 There is also evidence from Australian documents of Canada's 
intelligence-sharing with the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), that country's 
"Instructions to Canadian Representatives to the New Delhi Meetings in Indochina." 
Seaborn, interview. 
Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 248. 
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agency specializing in HUMINT. Toohey and Pinwill claim "the major business conducted 
between ASIS and the Canadians centred on the acquisition of Canadian reports on North 
Vietnam in the early 1960s. These were reports produced discreetly by Canadian members 
of the International Control Commission."20 They thus suggest that the ICSC exchange 
represented the main focus of the liaison between Canada and the ASIS. (Canadian and 
Australian SIGINT agencies had their own liaison under the UKUSA agreement.) 
Eayrs also notes that the intelligence-sharing was not one-way. The Americans 
willingly shared intelligence with the Canadians from the beginning of the operation in 
Indochina.21 When DEA approached the State Department for intelligence information it 
replied, "[it] would be glad to make available post reports and like information."22 Eayrs 
claims the intelligence provided to DEA was to assist the Canadian commissioners and 
"argue the United States' case within the three Indochina commissions."23 
The Department passed three types of intelligence to the allies. The first type 
related to commission activities that provided an "insider's knowledge of the state of play 
within ICSC Vietnam, ICSC Laos and ICSC Cambodia."24 Eayrs believes that the American 
government saw a great importance in this form of intelligence because "[its] programs for 
training armed forces in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos attracted the critical attention of the 
communists," and eventually came under the microscope of ICSC.25 Information from the 
Canadian delegation could have warned the Americans of impending discussion within the 
20
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Commissions and allowed them to prepare for any criticism about their actions in 
Indochina. 
The second form of intelligence related to conditions in the area, but particularly in 
North Vietnam. Seaborn says, "the Americans obviously were interested in whether I could 
tell them, or what other people there could tell them, about the economy, the political 
situation."26 North Vietnam was a closed society, and thus it was difficult to obtain such 
information. The ICSC members, however, could collect important information, for 
example, about the morale in the north.27 A Canadian ICSC representative provided 
intelligence to the Americans in Hanoi about Vietminh actions of preventing emigration, 
and the "deliberate obstructive tactics in order to delay the Commission team until they had 
dispersed refugees."28 
The third form of intelligence was military-oriented. Part of the Canadian 
delegation's duty was to "supervise and inspect the rotation of units and groups of 
personnel and the arrival and departure of personnel as authorized [by the Geneva 
Accords]."29 Seaborn claims that "[Canadian military personnel] had some opportunities to 
certainly observe what was happening; that was one of their jobs, to know if there were 
guns coming in or other violations of the cease-fire agreement, and in due course 
undoubtedly sharing it with other allies, the co-chairman and probably the United States as 
Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 244. 
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well." Pearson assured the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, that "Canadian 
military officers on the Commission had been secretly instructed to take advantage of every 
opportunity for observing military preparations or activities in Vietminh territory."31 
Information also came from non-military personnel. The head of the Canadian medical 
services in South Vietnam would later note that: 
Back in the summer of 1965 we would give the Americans any tidbits we picked 
up - anything we thought of importance to the Americans we would tell them. 
When the Americans bombed oil storage tanks outside Hanoi we had a 
delegation in Hanoi who took a number of pictures on the ground of the oil 
tanks being blasted by American planes....often information I supplied was 
passed on.32 
Eayrs maintains that military intelligence was the most important form for the Americans, 
given their role in training and equipping military forces in South Vietnam and later their 
direct military involvement.33 
Military officers in the Canadian delegation produced the Monthly Intelligence 
Review, which contained information collected from inspection missions. This review 
reported on a wide variety of information. For example, a "[Canadian] member in Pakse 
reports that the airfield there is being enlarged. He also advises that the Laotian Navy have 
three small craft moored in the river at Pakse...One of the craft mounts a 50 calibre machine 
The Americans occasionally requested specific types of intelligence. In May 1956, 
for example, the State Department asked Canadian officials for information on the ICSC's 
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awareness of the arrival in North Vietnam of Chinese, Czech and East German military 
technicians and "whether the Commission had received reports of the movement of 
military personnel into the Chinese and Soviet embassies in Hanoi."35 In another case, the 
CIA asked if it could debrief Commission members returning from their tour of duty in 
Indochina.36 Ambassador Heeney supported the American proposal, but the Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs, Jules Leger, did not. He responded, "we would 
prefer...to continue the policy of not permitting CIA direct access to our officers or to 
military personnel."37 Eayrs notes that there were however "exceptions to the rule."38 And 
Ottawa was apparently less concerned about other American agencies. In November of 
1956 a former Commissioner for ICSC Laos was debriefed by the State Department.39 Eayrs 
notes that several years later the policy changed unofficially, and "one CIA officer...used to 
come regularly to Ottawa specifically to talk with returning ICC members."40 
The Canadian officials with the ICSC assumed the other members of the 
Commissions, particularly the Poles, were not only aware of Canadians actions but also 
were themselves conducting similar operations. "I think they perfectly well knew what we 
were doing," notes Blair Seaborn.41 Similarly, "the Poles were keeping an eye on any 
information they could pick up on South Vietnam which might be of interest to Moscow. 
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We certainly knew that, but we just did not talk about it," adds Seaborn.42 "We had enough 
wrangling about the Commission."43 
Douglas Ross, author of In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam 1954-1973, 
provides a different interpretation of the Canadian intelligence operations in Indochina. 
While he barely mentions the intelligence aspects of the Canadian participation in the ICSC, 
he does acknowledge intelligence collection and sharing did occur. The Canadian personnel 
on both "mobile" and "fixed" teams, he notes, could collect information on North 
Vietnamese (Democratic Republic of Vietnam or DRVN) troop deployments and weapons 
capabilities. Ross, however, minimizes these activities. 
First, he claims the Canadian intelligence was only "marginally significant."44 Second, 
he emphasizes the limitations on the actual intelligence collected during the ICSC work: 
Considering the obstruction and deception such investigations always encountered, 
it is doubtful if information of particular significance was ever obtained. The DRVN 
'guided tours' were invariably unproductive. Much more could be learned from May 
Day parades and laudatory articles in the DRVN press about the 'vigilant,' capable 
units of the [People's Army of Vietnam] PAVN.45 
Ross fails to mention here that the delegation had considerable access to North Vietnam, 
something the Americans did not have. Moreover, the Canadian delegation would 
photograph bomb damaged areas, locations of strategic equipment, buildings, roads, 
bridges and storage facilities. This information was strategic intelligence and had significant 
value to support the American war. 
5.2 Controversy regarding Indochina Intelligence Sharing 
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When The Globe and Mail eventually uncovered the Canadian delegation's secret 
operations, in July 1965, the newspaper reported that the Americans changed their policies 
and tactics based on Canadian reports in North Vietnam.46 Two years later, The Montreal 
Star provided further information and claimed that Canadian officials in ICSC were 
"functioning as spies when they were supposed to be serving as international civil 
servants."47 The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) alleged that the US embassy in 
Saigon received reports before they were being sent to Ottawa for analysis.48 
Ross questions these criticisms, arguing that the idea of objectivity "was a myth 
peculiar to Canadian journalists and left-liberal systemist [sic] academics."49 He also argues 
that "all Canadians were instructed to exhibit great care in not compromising publicly in any 
way their self-declared status as impartial, objective observers in Indochina."50 
Despite the evidence, the government held to the longstanding claims. Both Prime 
Minister Pearson and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin Sr., denied the 
accusations. The government released the following statement, "Members of the Canadian 
delegation in Vietnam are not engaged in clandestine or spying activities. These Canadians, 
just like other members of the international truce commission, carry out a quasi-diplomatic 
task which includes observation of local conditions and discussions with the local authorities 
Ross, In the Interests of Peace Canada and Vietnam, 208. 
46
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of both North and South Vietnam."51 In the House of Commons, Tommy Douglas, leader of 
the New Democratic Party (NDP), questioned Pearson as to whether "information such as 
photographs, tape recordings or other information has been turned over at any time by any 
Canadian military personnel to the United States authorities."52 Pearson denied that the 
Canadian delegation was conducting clandestine operations. It may have been strictly true 
that clandestine operations were not employed and perhaps unnecessary. But the Prime 
Minister was implicitly acknowledging there had been sharing. 
To summarize, the DEA actively provided foreign intelligence to Canada's allies 
during its diplomatic mission in Indochina. Canada's intelligence-sharing was not a short-
term operation. This case study has shown that Canadian diplomats (and soldiers) had 
important foreign intelligence collection roles. 
5.3 Canadian intelligence operations in Cuba, 1960s 
Another case of the DEA's involvement in foreign intelligence collection abroad is its 
operation in the late 1950s and early 1960s in Cuba. In January 1959, Fidel Castro and his 
26th of July forces overthrew the repressive regime of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. Initially, 
both the American and Canadian governments quickly recognized the new Cuban regime. 
Castro would become a threat to American national security only when he began 
nationalizing American-owned businesses (such as the International Telephone and 
Telegraph Company (ITT) and United Fruit Company (UFC)), and expropriated lands without 
providing any financial compensation to American owners. Eventually, Castro's anti-
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American stance and his promotion of socialist ideals led to hostilities between Cuba and 
the United States. 
The American government reacted with two policies. US President Dwight 
Eisenhower gradually imposed trade restrictions that led to a complete embargo on trade 
relations between the two countries. The fallout from the trade embargo resulted in Castro 
seeking assistance from other countries, especially the Soviet bloc. Before Eisenhower left 
office he approved the planning of a covert operation to assist and train Cuban exiles to 
overthrow the Castro regime. The eventual attack, ordered by President John F. Kennedy, 
would become known as the "Bay of Pigs" incident. In late 1960, Castro also "accused the 
United States of using its embassy in Havana for spying, and demanded a drastic reduction 
in the number of personnel stationed there."53 The American administration responded by 
ending diplomatic relations and permanently closing its embassy on January 3,1961.54 
Canada's response to the Castro regime differed from that of the Americans. The 
Canadian government was against the increasing presence and influence the Soviets were 
exerting on Cuba. Yet, it did not support operations to forcibly remove Castro from power. 
The Canadian government followed the British policy that "it was appropriate to maintain 
diplomatic relations with countries whether or not one approved of their internal politics."55 
Don Munton, "Our Men in Havana: Washington and Canadian Intelligence on Castro's Cuba, 1959-1963" 
(paper presented, 2002 Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) Conference, Ottawa, 
Ont, September 29, 2002) (soon to be an article): 2. 
54
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Similarly, Ottawa also thought it was "appropriate to maintain trade relations with these 
same countries, subject to restrictions mutually agreed to by the western allies."56 The 
Canadian government's decision to maintain its embassy in Cuba became both a political 
and a strategic intelligence advantage. 
Don Munton has documented that Canadian diplomats conducted intelligence 
collection operations out of the Canadian embassy in Cuba after the closing of the US 
embassy, and that Ottawa shared this intelligence with the US and UK. Whereas in the ICSC 
case, the Canadian government approached Washington and offered to share intelligence 
from Indochina, this time the Americans first approached Canada (and Britain) for 
intelligence on Cuba.57 Whereas military observers on the Canadian ICSC delegation 
performed most of the intelligence field work in Indochina, diplomats from External Affairs 
conducted the operations in Cuba. In other respects, the intelligence liaison arrangement 
regarding Cuba was quite similar to that undertaken in Indochina. 
It is believed that in early 1961, the State Department approached the Canadian 
embassy in Washington for intelligence on Cuba, "presumably including reports from the 
Canadian embassy in Havana."58 The timing of such a request could not be a coincidence. 
The loss of their embassy weakened the Americans' ability both to gather intelligence 
themselves and to run agents in Cuba since they no longer had a base of operations on the 
island. 
56
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The Canadian embassy in Cuba collected intelligence on the political situation, socio-
economics, and the military.59 The political intelligence was specifically focused on two 
aspects: evaluating the influence of Communism in the Cuban government and determining 
the extent of domestic support for Castro.60 To take one example, Malcolm Bow, the 
Canadian charge d'affaires, conducted a tour of the eastern provinces of Cuba in 1961. Bow 
discovered that Castro's government had initiated the construction of housing, centralized 
schooling for children in the region and the development of "luxurious tourist resorts." "He 
found a distinct "proletarian" emphasis to the reconstruction programs of the 
government."61 The quality of life in Cuba was being enhanced, but Bow also saw "evidence 
of the evils of authoritarianism, indoctrination and regimentation" in Castro's regime.62 
Canadian diplomats provided the Americans with information relevant to what 
became the Bay of Pigs failure. The CIA assumed that the planned invasion would prompt 
the rise of popular opposition against Castro. The Canadian embassy indicated in August 
1960, however, that there was relatively minor opposition to Castro's government.63 Again, 
just months prior to the actual Bay of Pigs operation, diplomats reported the main 
opposition group had disbanded making unlikely any overthrow of the government.64 
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of World War III. The 
Canadian embassy in Havana did not detect the deployment of missiles but did report 
In mid-1961, the Canadian government selected a new ambassador to Cuba, George Kidd. Munton 
speculates that Kidd may have been chosen because of his experience as a DL2 officer. 
60
 Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 7. 
61
 Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 7. 
62
 Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 7. 
63
 Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 8. 
64
 Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 8. 
121 
specific information related to the Soviet military build up on the island.65 In August, 
Canadian diplomats reported the arrival and presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 
and they observed "a column of tanks and vehicles with Russian drivers on a highway."66 
The Canadian diplomats also conducted a "drive-by" operation to observe the presence of 
Soviet military personnel.67 In the aftermath of the crisis, the embassy staff kept a close 
watch of the activities on the island in order to ensure that the nuclear weapons were 
removed from the country.68 
Canadian diplomats gathered HUM I NT from Cubans, talking to individuals about 
their experiences and observations. Some of the people the embassy personnel 
interviewed, "included members of the anti-Castro forces in Cuba as well as senior 
government officials, and such individuals as released prisoners, a shipping company 
employee, a government engineer, a senior Cuban civilian pilot (who had flown for RCAF), 
and a variety of unnamed sources whose identity the embassy chose not to reveal to 
Ottawa."69 The embassy in Havana also interviewed Canadians travelling in Cuba, and 
reported their views to Ottawa - a sort of "interview program" in the field. 
In March of 1962, DL2 sent a message instructing the embassy in Havana to copy its 
dispatches directly to the Canadian embassies in London and Washington.70 "The purpose 
in having the telegrams sent to Washington and London, of course, was to expedite them 
Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 8. 
Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 8-9. 
Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 9. 
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122 
being handed on to the respective governments."71 The embassy in Cuba was told to mark 
information that should not be shared with the allies (as "Canadian Eyes Only"). Information 
relating to Canada-Cuba economic relations was usually not shared. 
Occasionally Washington made direct requests. In July of 1961, the Americans asked 
for a list of publications they wished to acquire from Cuba. Specifically, they wanted the 
daily Communist Party newspaper Hoy, the Cuban Sugar Year Book and the Annual Report 
of the Consolidated Railroads of Cuba.72 During the Cuban missile crisis Washington asked 
for Canadian views on how Cubans had reacted, and whether radio broadcasts of Voice of 
America were being jammed by the Castro regime.73 
The Canadian embassy in Havana did not have a military attache among its staff.74 
The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) discussed the appointment of an attache and 
proposed the idea to External Affairs.75 When DEA asked newly appointed ambassador 
George Kidd for his opinion on the matter, "he argued such a request from Canada might 
well be regarded with great suspicion by the government of Cuba."76 Kidd marked his 
letter, "Not for distribution to DND."77 As a result of not having a military attache, embassy 
diplomats were required to conduct some military related work, for instance, "taking 
pictures of and writing detailed reports on the annual January Cuban military parade in 
Havana" and observing military bases.78 
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What was the justification for DEA to share intelligence with the Americans? 
Munton suggests three possible explanations. First, "Canada may have been seeking to 
influence United States views and policy toward Cuba" through intelligence sharing. 
Second, Canada may have hoped that by cooperating and sharing intelligence, the American 
government would tone down its criticisms of Canadian foreign policy towards Cuba. Third, 
Canada may have provided intelligence as a part of its obligation to allied intelligence 
cooperating and sharing.79 This was the time of the Cold War and Canada likely wanted to 
do what it could to provide better Western intelligence on Soviet activities in Cuba. 
The intelligence sharing was certainly not a result of a close Canadian-American 
relationship; at the time, relations were at an all time low. Canadian Prime Minister John G. 
Diefenbaker and US President John F. Kennedy never had a great liking for each other; 
especially when Diefenbaker stalled on the question of accepting American nuclear 
weapons on Canadian soil. During the Cuban missile crisis Kennedy never consulted 
Diefenbaker about the crisis or about NORAD being placed on defense condition 3 (Defcon), 
though such consultation was required under the NORAD treaty. Diefenbaker was quoted 
calling Kennedy "a boastful son of a bitch" and feared his lack of political experience would 
start another war.80 
The third explanation for providing intelligence, as a part of Canada's assistance to 
the allied intelligence cooperating and sharing agreements, seems the most probable.81 
Seaborn states that "the Americans and British have always been very generous with their 
79
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sharing of intelligence, and you feel some obligation to give them a little bit back. If we 
have some, we will want to share it. We are not major contributors, but we felt that it was 
worthwhile sharing what we had."82 
To summarize, Canadian diplomats in Cuba gathered foreign intelligence for the 
United States during the 1960s. The Department willingly supported these operations, once 
again, in part because of the Soviet threat to North America and in part because of the 
norm of quid pro quo in intelligence cooperation. Canada's relationship with Cuba was an 
intelligence asset for the Americans. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, these two case studies are useful examples of intelligence operations 
conducted by External Affairs and of the kinds of intelligence liaison activities in which the 
Department has long been engaged. While intelligence studies have examined the roles of 
CSIS and other agencies in the collection of foreign intelligence, and examined the role of 
Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE) in international intelligence 
cooperation, they have paid insufficient attention to the role of External Affairs in both 
collection and international dissemination. 
The assumption that the Department does not conduct foreign intelligence 
operations is thus clearly false. International law even permits diplomats to collect overt 
"intelligence" in a host country and Canadian diplomats have taken full advantages of this 
provision. The actions of the diplomats did not so much tread a fine line between 
diplomacy and intelligence collection as exploit the gray area between the two. Both case 
Seaborn, interview. 
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studies also show that Canada's foreign intelligence work assists its allies and provides an 
intelligence advantage. 
Intelligence brings texture to knowledge. 
-Kurt Jensen1 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This thesis began by posing two central questions. First, what structures has the 
Department of Foreign Affairs established to deal with intelligence and what were their 
roles? Second, what sort of foreign intelligence collection operations, particularly HUMINT 
related ones, has the Department conducted? 
Since 1909 the Department of External Affairs and its succecessors have promoted 
Canada's external relations and managed its representation aboard. At the same time, its 
involvement and participation in foreign intelligence work developed and expanded beyond 
simple clerical work to more sophisticated operational work. The point was made here that 
there is not really any sort of clear line that can be drawn between standard "diplomatic 
reporting" and intelligence collection. Most of the Department's foreign intelligence-related 
work can be categorized as "grey intelligence;" it "is neither entirely open source nor 
clandestine in origin."2 
Chapter 2 presented a description and analysis of Canada's current foreign 
intelligence players and their relationship with DFAIT. This chapter showed that DFAIT is a 
central organization of foreign intelligence collection, assessment and sharing in Canada. 
The Department has a specific unit devoted to foreign intelligence work, the Foreign 
Intelligence Division (ISI), which oversees the collection, assessment/evaluation and 
1
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dissemination of foreign intelligence, and acts as a consultant to the other parts of the 
department. ISI also acts as a central hub of the Department's intelligence-sharing with 
other members of the Canadian intelligence community and allies. ISI oversees two 
programs that engage in non-clandestine collection of HUMINT: the Interview Program 
Section (ISIW) and Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP). 
Chapter 2 also examined the relationships the Department has with the Canadian 
intelligence community. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and DFAIT have a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in place to facilitate liaison and intelligence sharing. 
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and DFAIT work together in several areas 
of intelligence collection within Canada and abroad under the CSIS Act. They also have a 
MOU to facilitate liaison and intelligence-sharing (e.g., CSIS officers posted at ISI offices). 
DFAIT is a member of CSIS' Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC). Located in the ISI 
division of the DFAIT is the Client Relations Unit (ISIF), jointly staffed by DFAIT and CSE. ISIF's 
main mission is to disseminate special intelligence. It is alleged that CSE and DFAIT have 
cooperated on so-called "embassy collection." One interviewee for this thesis, Allan 
Gotlieb, a former under-secretary (deputy minister) for External Affairs, acknowledged the 
existence of embassy collection. Finally, DFAIT and the Privy Council Office (PCO) cooperate 
and share intelligence, and once jointly managed the International Assessment Staff (IAS). 
Chapter 3 looked briefly at the reasons the government originally established the 
Department of External Affairs (DEA) and argued the key need was essentially an 
intelligence requirement. At that time, Canada was a passive receiver of British intelligence 
but had little capacity and no formal structures for collation, assessment and analysis let 
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alone collection of intelligence. James Eayrs explains that the establishment of the 
Department was a result of a need for organized and comprehensive information to guide 
early Canadian foreign policy.3 Furthermore, Eayrs notes that "it was only slowly that 
Canadian governments came to appreciate the intimate connection of intelligence...and the 
quality of their external affairs."4 
The chapter then posed several questions: How did the Department organize its 
intelligence structures and how did they evolve over the postwar period? The activities and 
role of External Affairs developed during World War II, when the Department was thrust 
into foreign intelligence activities. It actively participated (directly and indirectly) in analysis 
of SIGINT intercepts, intercepting mail as part of Canadian censorship activities, debriefing 
German POWs, and debriefing repatriated Canadians who had been held in Europe or Asia. 
Canada's foreign policy and foreign intelligence work expanded in the post-war era, 
as a result of the Cold War and the need to support foreign intelligence agreements signed 
during the war and extended into the post-war. The UKUSA Agreement of 1948 is one of 
the most important of Canada's secret multilateral security and intelligence sharing and 
cooperation arrangements. It is assumed that the Department has actively contributed to 
these agreements because of its responsibility for Canada's external relations and its 
involvement in the Canadian intelligence community. 
During the post-war period, the DEA became actively involved in development and 
organization of many key foreign intelligence structures in Canada. The DEA assisted in the 
3
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creation of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) and the 
Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS). DEA personnel were chairs and members of these structures. 
In November 1948, External Affairs established the Defence Liaison Division (DL) to co-
ordinate defence and foreign intelligence matters with other departments and allies. The 
Head of DL was also the chairman of the JIC and JIB. 
By 1949 External Affairs decided to separate DL into two divisions, due in part to 
increasing work-load. Defence Liaison 2 (DL2) became responsible for security and 
intelligence matters. DL2 personnel continued to chair various intelligence committees. 
DL2 had a relationship with the Communications Branch of the National Research Council 
(CBNRC), the predecessor of CSE, and thus some responsibility for Canadian signals 
intelligence. For about twenty years the head of DL2 was also the "Director of 
Communications Security" (DCS) for CBNRC.5 In fact the DCS out ranked the director of 
CBNRC in issues relating to operations. 
The next four decades saw numerous, sometimes rapid, organizational changes in 
the Department with respect to intelligence. This thesis provides, for the first time, what 
might be termed the "organizational history" of the structures created by the Department 
to handle foreign intelligence matters over this period. The evolution of these structures 
has not previously been traced in their entirety. 
Chapter 4 presented the first two of four case studies on the Department's foreign 
intelligence structures and collection efforts. The first case focused on operations of the 
Special Intelligence Section (SIS) from 1942 until 1945 (thus predating DL2). External Affairs 
5
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had a close relationship with Canada's SIGINT agency, the Examination Unit (XU). The 
Department provided financial and organizational assistance to establish the Unit and had 
representatives on the "Y" Committee that planned its operations and provided tasking and 
direction. The Special Intelligence Section (SIS) was a translation and intelligence 
assessment unit to complement the XU. The head of SIS was a Canadian diplomat (and 
scholar on Japan), Herbert Norman. The Department gave SIS responsibility for "selecting, 
editing and otherwise interpreting the material which was produced in the Examination 
Unit."6 SIS translated and analyzed Vichy French, Free French and Imperial Japan signals 
traffic. Tommy Stone, who acted as intelligence coordinator for External Affairs, saw the 
work of SIS as a way for Canada to increase its contribution and provide the quid pro quo of 
intelligence sharing.7 In the United States, the OSS was an "avid consumer" of SIS 
intelligence products, as were the British.8 In January 1945, as the war was coming to its 
conclusion, DEA closed SIS. 
The second case study focused on the Interview Program Section (ISIW). Since 1953, 
the Interview Program has collected HUMINT through debriefing of Canadians and others 
who go abroad. The Interview Program does not employ covert tactics to collect 
intelligence. It basically asks ordinary Canadians and others to provide observations from 
their foreign travels, generally of a political, military, social, and scientific nature. They 
volunteered, after being approached, or they themselves approached the Interview 
6
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Program to share their information. Initially, the unit chose only to interview engineers, 
technicians, business people, academics and scientists. Later it realized that anyone 
travelling abroad might have useful information for the government. 
On April 1,1968, the JIB, the unit that housed the Program, was moved from 
Department of National Defence (DND) to External Affairs, as was the Interview Program, 
due to departmental consolidation.9 Once there, the Interview Program was renamed the 
"Domestic Contact Section" and operated as a "separate entity" of the Security and 
Intelligence Liaison Division.10 Its operations did not undergo any radical changes until the 
1980s. Since the creation of the Interview Program Section in 1953, it has weathered 
political storms, budget cuts and departmental restructuring. 
Chapter 5 presented the third and fourth case studies on the Department's 
intelligence collection abroad. In 1954 Canada joined the International Commissions for 
Supervision and Control (ICSC) to supervise and oversee the end of hostilities in Indochina. 
Canada's official role in the ICSC was to act in a "solely supervisory, judicial, and mediatory" 
capacity.11 Prior to Canada's acceptance of membership, however, the Canadian 
Ambassador to the United States, A. D. P. Heeney, went to the State Department to inform 
the Americans that the Canadian ICSC delegation would provide intelligence collected in the 
field.12 Lester B. Pearson wanted to ensure that any intelligence provided to the Americans 
should not be discussed in the public; otherwise Canada "would have to reconsider the 
9
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whole policy of passing on information to the United States."13 Providing intelligence to the 
Americans was clearly a sensitive matter. 
Canadian officials none the less collected and shared intelligence with the United 
States and other allies - basically the "Five Eyes" of the UKUSA arrangement, from the 
outset of Canada's involvement with the ICSC. Both DEA and DND provided personnel for 
the Canadian ICSC delegations. The Canadians gathered HUMINT and used similar methods 
to those used by other diplomats and attaches, such as observing military positions and 
operations and interviewing people in the field. As Blair Seaborn commented, we "had 
physical access to see what was happening in that country, which the Americans did not 
have, unless they had agents up there."14 
The Department passed three types of intelligence to the allies: intelligence related 
to commission activities; intelligence related to conditions in the area, especially North 
Vietnam; and military-oriented intelligence. 
The Canadian media uncovered the delegation's secret operations and claimed 
Canadians were "functioning as spies when they were supposed to be serving as 
international civil servants."15 The government denied the accusations. Nevertheless, 
Canada's ICSC intelligence-gathering and sharing lasted for almost twenty-years. 
The last case study focused on the Department's intelligence collection in Cuba 
during the 1960s. The Canadian embassy in Havana, at the request of Washington, began 
intensively collecting foreign intelligence after the United States broke diplomatic relations 
Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 242 and 243. 
James Blair Seaborn, interview with author, December 8, 2003, Ottawa, Ontario. 
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with the Castro government. The Canadian embassy in Havana collected intelligence on the 
political, socio-economic, and military situation. While the embassy did not detect the 
deployment of missiles during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, it did report specific 
information related to the Soviet military build up on the island.16 Canadian diplomats also 
gathered HUMINT from Cubans and others. The foreign intelligence work in Cuba was again 
a reflection of Canada's commitment to allied intelligence cooperating and sharing 
agreements. As Seaborn states, "the Americans and British have always been very 
generous with their sharing of intelligence, and you feel some obligation to give them a 
little bit back."17 Canada collected and shared intelligence with its allies because of 
perceived common threats and because of its desire to fulfill the quid pro quo norm of 
Western intelligence. 
6.0 Final Thoughts 
It is hoped this thesis will contribute to a greater discussion at the academic level 
about Canadian foreign intelligence issues and particularly about the considerable role of 
the Department of Foreign Affairs. This thesis also shows that intelligence issues can be 
researched and discussed in the public domain without violating government secrecy. This 
thesis shows that the Department has long been actively involved in many aspects of 
foreign intelligence work. The Canadian foreign intelligence debate needs to acknowledge 
that the Department is not simply a consumer of foreign intelligence but also a producer of 
it. 
16
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This thesis adopted a descriptive approach to highlight the Department's foreign 
intelligence work. As indicated, there is no existing comprehensive account of its 
intelligence operations. The basic descriptive information presented in this thesis will 
however allow others to proceed to analyze and/or theorize about the Department's 
operations. This thesis therefore may serve to enhance theoretical discussions and debates 
on Canadian foreign policy and intelligence. 
This thesis like all other theses encountered several limitations. The most obvious 
limitation was government secrecy - an intrinsic part of the intelligence area. Information 
relating to the subject matter was very difficult to find in the public domain, and is released 
very slowly by the government, if at all. For that reason, it was necessary and desirable to 
conduct the interviews that are part of this thesis. The organization history of the 
Department's intelligence units, presented in Chapter 3, is likely not entirely correct and 
complete. It is, however, the best that can be done with the available sources. Given the 
difficulties of obtaining documentary evidence, the case studies examined here are not as 
recent as might be desirable, let alone current -w i th the exception of the on-going 
Interview Program. Further research and analysis in this area must be conducted in the near 
future as further information becomes available. 
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